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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
During the period 3–8 October 2010, the United States Naval War College in Newport,
Rhode Island hosted the Navy Title 10 Global Maritime Partnerships Game (GMPG, also
Global ‗10), on a truly international scale (83 participants from 46 countries). The
overarching purpose of the GMPG was to help the Navy better understand the complexity of
the problems that it could face throughout the maritime environment by identifying the
catalysts to instability at the national, regional and cross-regional levels and the impediments
to forming effective regional and global partnerships in the maritime domain from both
United States and international perspectives. This game could help the Navy better define
the approaches necessary to establish maritime partnerships to address maritime security
issues.
While the Navy has multiple inputs to theater security cooperation plans in the different
regions, there should be a better understanding of how and why these forces and capabilities
are being used, where they are being used, and what is necessary to achieve the desired end
state described in the new Maritime Strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower (CS-21).
The GMPG was structured to explore the following four specific objectives:
•

Identify maritime regional and cross-regional challenges (e.g., resource scarcity,
epidemics and pandemics, and regional and transnational criminality) from both
international and U.S. perspectives

•

Identify broad-based partnership requirements (e.g., policy, legal, technological, etc.)
that will enable Maritime Domain Awareness in order to counter these challenges

•

Provide an environment for participants to explore and appreciate the complexities of
establishing and maintaining effective maritime partnerships through domestic and
international perspectives

•

Provide participants with an opportunity to familiarize themselves with a sampling of
current technological research and innovations in Maritime Domain Awareness.

In order to address the mutually agreed upon objectives established by OPNAV N2/N6 and
the Naval War College the following overarching research question is proffered in this game:
•

Based on the catalysts to instability derived from the participants, what were the
impediments and proposed collaborative solutions to forming effective partnerships at the
sub-regional, regional and cross regional levels from both United States and international
perspectives?

The Global ‘10 Game was designed to enhance participants‘ understanding of the
complexities encountered in developing maritime partnerships, information sharing processes
and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). For the players, the game served as an
1
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experiential and educational venue to explore with other nations various current regional
approaches to MDA and then consider how partners might collaborate through new
relationships, improved information sharing regimes and enhanced MDA in order to better
solve the varied, yet often intractable, maritime problems in each region. Additional
understanding of these regional issues, which can become catalysts to regional and global
instability, and the preferred solutions, informs US Navy and other maritime service decision
making about maritime security from a US perspective (USC Title 10 requirement to:
organize, train, equip). Research events in support of the game design can be found in
Appendix C.
For this descriptive game, the game design created a collegial atmosphere where the players
could learn from each other, and enabled the perspectives and experiences of the players to
be recorded for subsequent post-game analysis. At the conclusion of the game, the Data
Collection and Analysis Team (DCAT) applied a variety of qualitative tools and techniques
to aggregate data and identify key themes that may prove of interest to the sponsor for future
research, policy making, and resourcing purposes.
This was not a single, stand-alone game; but rather, was designed to be serial in nature along
a research path paralleling development of international maritime partnerships. This game
draws on broad experience from other NWC games over the past several years that focused
on the maritime security challenges, specifically: MDA Connectivity Workshops, Global
2008, Irregular Challenges Game 2010, MDA Operational Game, SEALIFT 2010 and the
Multilateral War Game 2010.
Analytical Findings and Recommendations:
•

To achieve global MDA through maritime partnerships, the United States should pursue
involvement in all current regional MDA/partnership efforts. By working to develop and
mature the individual regional MDA/partnership solutions, the United States will become
a trusted partner in sharing information and addressing the key issues upon which the
regional nations are focused. Participants expected that once the initial regional focus is
successful, participating nations will be willing to expand their maritime partnerships
beyond their immediate region. Connected regions would then be able to build broader,
more comprehensive MDA partnership solutions. MDA will grow from within one
region and overlap neighboring regions, progressively providing a global solution to
MDA and maritime partnerships.

•

Given the wide range of partnership barriers encountered by the international
participants, the U.S. Navy should concentrate more of its efforts at the sub-regional and
regional levels and work towards transforming bilateral arrangements into broader
multilateral arrangements to achieve a more robust global maritime understanding. A
bottom-up vice top-down approach to address regional issues is preferred in each region
to establish and develop maritime partnerships, information sharing processes and MDA
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•

All navies and governments should work towards establishing standard processes,
procedures and protocols for MDA networks, data exchange, and data classification at the
national, sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels. This will of necessity be a
lengthy, messy process. Standard processes in one region will not be the same as in
another region. Only as regional growth leads to cross-regional linkages can conflicting
processes be resolved in this preferred bottom-up solution.
Efforts should be focused to work within existing sub-regional and regional
organizations (e.g., political – Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Indian Ocean
Naval Symposium (IONS), African Union (AU), Economic Union of Central
African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of Western African States
(ECOWAS)), and leverage bilateral agreements as well as the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) on a case by case basis to facilitate standardization
development at the regional and cross-regional levels.

•

In order to overcome the legal barriers of information sharing and maritime security
operations, individual nations should work towards aligning domestic legislation through
the adoption of international regulations.
Leverage existing models such as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on
Combating Piracy and Armed Groups in Southeast Asia, Proliferation Security
Initiative, and existing political organizations (EU, NATO, GCC, etc.) as
proposed cooperative maritime security models.

•

All navies and governments should work towards increasing funding of non-technology
aspects of partnership building (training, coalition conferences/seminars, and travel).
Investments in relationship building should have a higher priority than investments in
new systems and technology.
The U.S. Navy working with international partners should develop a GMP/MDA
distant education initiative (e.g., web-enabled program, CD-ROM based
correspondence program) whereby all U.S. and international maritime
stakeholders (e.g., military, civilian, industry etc) would have access to a common
resource database that provides literature, live news feeds and upcoming events
on existing partnerships and MDA initiatives at the national, sub-regional,
regional and cross-regional levels. Specific documentation noted by the players
include MDA and GMP strategies, polices, laws, best practices, peer-reviewed
articles, symposium briefings etc.
The U.S. Navy should enhance international military education and training
funding (e.g., noted by players through Section 1206 and Combatant Commander
funds) across all regions for those countries who seek to engage in international
maritime security partnership initiatives.
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All navies should leverage existing exercises and establish new exercises and
training opportunities to enhance relationships. Multiple regions preferred mil-tomil exercises as the first step to partnerships, but concluded that secure, longlasting partnerships would need to come through diplomatic relationships.
The Chief of Naval Operations should designate research and development funds
over the next 5 years to improve information sharing processes and understanding
of technological interoperability requirements through academic gaming and
research. These funds would be separate funds dedicated towards advancing the
theory and practice of Maritime Domain Awareness at the sub-regional regional
and cross-regional levels.
•

The U.S. Navy should increase Navy Liaison Officer billets to meet the requirements of
staffing and expanding maritime security partnerships focused at the sub-regional and
regional levels.
Within the FAO program, seek to create an MDA focus or career track (e.g.,
education, training, and experience with international partners and industry).
Personnel should work closely with key regional maritime stakeholders and U.S
leadership on operational and strategic information sharing issues at the subregional and regional levels.

•

Procure and install MDA infrastructure (shore radar, communications, port facilities,
coordination centers, laboratory facilities, fixed and portable equipment), operational
assets (e.g., patrol vessels and aircraft), and pursue education and training opportunities
for both individual personnel and organizations to build partnerships.

•

Leverage and integrate existing regional and trans-regional technologies to share
unclassified shipping data (VRMTC, MSSIS, REMIX, and SUCBAS etc). Work towards
developing technological working groups to integrate existing MDA infrastructure and
develop technical common standards at the national, sub-regional, regional and crossregional level. Technical feasibility studies were suggested by the players as a
mechanism to support these working groups.

•

All navies and governments should work towards fostering increased governmental
appreciation of important maritime issues by developing a shared understanding of the
importance of the ocean to a individual countries through building relationships with
governmental leaders and increasing their maritime knowledge by providing them
relevant maritime talking points, facts, briefing materials, articles, etc.

•

All MDA participants should focus MDA cooperation and coalitions around maritime
(body of water) commonalities, processes and protocols vice those that are land based.

4
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2. INTRODUCTION
2.1. Overview. The War Gaming Department of the U.S. Naval War College hosted the
Global Maritime Partnerships (GMP) Game, 3 - 8 October, 2010. The game was
sponsored by OPNAV N2/N6 on behalf of the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Gary
Roughead. The game was held in McCarty Little Hall at the Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island.
The Global Maritime Partnerships Game featured 83 participants representing 46
countries, all of which were selected based on their locations as well as their willingness
to participate in a MDA-related information sharing experience. The following nations
participated: Argentina, Australia , Azerbaijan, Benin , Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon,
Canada, Chile , Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt , France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany,
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mexico,
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Pakistan, Peru,
Poland, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Tanzania, Togo, Turkey,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States (List of attendees available in
Appendix A).
2.2. Background. The U.S. Navy has embarked on an ambitious initiative to implement a
new maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS-21). This
is the first new U.S. Navy strategy that addresses the post-Cold War and post-9/11
realities of global terrorism. The new strategy is consistent with the National Security
Strategy and the National Strategy for Maritime Security, as well as with other national
guidance. As a key part of this strategy, Global Maritime Partnerships (originally titled
the 1000-ship Navy) is a key tenet of U.S. naval policy.
Current and future efforts to bring about Global Maritime Partnerships must address the
ongoing challenge of information sharing or Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).
Information sharing will not only enhance the Navy‘s war fighting capabilities but will
also help the Navy meet the two new core capabilities, maritime security and
humanitarian assistance missions that are an integral part of the new maritime strategy.
Information sharing and maritime partnerships create the environment to provide
security and stability against WMD proliferation, piracy, weapons, illegal immigration,
slavery, fishery violations and drugs in the maritime domain. That security and stability
has an effect on global economics.
A maritime partnership is an association of maritime nations that participate in
international commerce, each having a stake in security and freedom of the seas. The
partnerships are necessary to confront the large, complex challenges and to maintain
stability. Partners assist all countries in using the sea for lawful purposes including
commerce.
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The purpose of Global ‘10 was to identify the catalysts to instability at the national,
regional and cross-regional levels as well as the impediments to forming effective
regional and global partnerships in the maritime domain from both United States and
international perspectives.
Understanding these impediments is important to Navy Title 10 (organize, train, equip)
responsibilities because these catalysts to instability (including, but not limited to
resource scarcity, epidemics and pandemics, and regional and transnational criminality)
foster broad challenges to U.S. national security policy. The U.S. Navy plays a critical
role in confronting such challenges through forward presence, deterrence, sea control,
power projection, maritime security and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response
(HA/DR). As emphasized by players in Global‗08 , such efforts cannot be sustained
without effective regional and international engagement and cooperative maritime
security partnerships (i.e., Maritime Domain Awareness).
The Global Maritime Partnerships Game drew on the broad experiences from other
NWC games that focused on the maritime security challenges, specifically: Global ‘08,
International Seapower Symposium (ISS) XIX, Irregular Challenges Game 2010, MDA
Operational Game 2010, Strategic SEALIFT 2010 and the Multilateral War Game 2010.
Each event reported consistent findings that maritime security issues can be best
addressed through partnerships developed to counter the various instability factors that
affect the global commons. As CS-21 declares, cooperative relationships between
nations contribute to a secure and stable maritime domain. For a more detailed
description of each of the referenced events, see Appendix B.
2.3. Purpose of GMPG. Identify impediments to forming effective regional and global
partnerships within the maritime domain from both international and U.S. perspectives.
2.4. GMPG Objectives. In support of the above purpose, there were four objectives:
Identify maritime regional and cross-regional challenges (e.g., resource scarcity,
epidemics and pandemics, and regional and transnational criminality) from both
international and U.S. perspectives.
Identify broad-based partnership requirements (e.g., policy, legal, technological,
etc.) that will enable Maritime Domain Awareness in order to counter these
challenges.
Provide an environment for participants to explore and appreciate the
complexities of establishing and maintaining effective maritime partnerships
through domestic and international perspectives.
Provide participants with an opportunity to familiarize themselves with a
sampling of current technological research and innovations in Maritime Domain
Awareness.
6
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2.5 Research Questions
One of the most important functions of gaming is to answer timely research questions
posed by the sponsors. In order to do so, capturing data that is germane to a specific area
of interest is critical, because successful data capture enables useful analysis and ensures
a symbiotic relationship between game design and subsequent findings.
Accordingly, it is important to remember that the role of any war game is to aid the
sponsors, participants, and consumers of game results to investigate the processes of
combat, strategy and human decision making not necessarily to calculate the outcome of
a specific engagement. This was a highly inductive, descriptive game employing the
qualitative methodology known as a case study. This research strategy investigated a
phenomenon within its real-life context by employing in-depth, focused surveying and
broader open-ended facilitation. This allowed researchers to explore causation in order to
find underlying principles and reasoning behind participant actions.
This game was unique in that the players, both military and civilian, identified the
catalysts to instability, impediments, and proposed collaborative solutions through
partnerships at the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels in order to improve
maritime safety and security. The intent of identifying and then exploring catalysts to
instability in the game design was to provide a rich, political-military environment that
enabled each cell to explore a wide range of diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic interactions for enabling partnerships at the sub-regional, regional, and crossregional levels.
In order to address the mutually agreed upon objectives established by the OPNAV Staff
sponsor and the Naval War College, the following overarching research question was
developed for this game:
Based on the catalyst to instability derived from the participants, what were the
impediments and proposed collaborative solutions to forming effective partnerships at
the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels from both United States and
international perspectives?
The broad central question employed in this study examined the central phenomenon of
"Global Maritime Partnerships". The intent of this question was to decipher the complex
set of factors surrounding the central phenomenon and present the varied perspectives or
meanings that both U.S. and international participants hold. Because of the highly
inductive, descriptive approach of this study, the central question explored in this game
was intended to be broad in nature so that the data collection and analysis would not be
limited. The subsequent descriptive and inferential sub-questions were designed to
provide a greater level of depth to exploring this complex area of study. At a more
structured level, this game sought to inductively examine the following research
questions:
7
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What did the international participants in this game consider to be the present-day
catalysts to instability at the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels?
What did the U.S. participants in this game consider to be the present-day
catalysts to instability at the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels?
What did the international participants in this game consider to be the
impediments to forming maritime partnerships at the sub-regional, regional and crossregional levels?
What did the U.S. participants in this game consider to be the impediments to
forming maritime partnerships at the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels?
What did the international participants in this game consider to be the solutions to
forming maritime partnerships at the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels?
What did the U.S. participants in this game consider to be the solutions to forming
maritime partnerships at the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels?
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3. GAME DESIGN & RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1. Game Design Introduction
3.1.1. The Global Maritime Partnerships Game 2010 (GMPG) was designed to enhance
participants‘ understanding of the complexities encountered in developing maritime
partnerships, information sharing processes and Maritime Domain Awareness
(MDA). For the players, the game served as an experiential and educational venue
to explore with other partner nations various current regional approaches to MDA
and then consider how partners might collaborate through new relationships,
improved information sharing regimes and enhanced MDA in order to better solve
the varied, yet often intractable, maritime problems in each region. Additional
understanding of these regional issues, which can become catalysts to regional and
global instability, and the preferred solutions, informs US Navy and other maritime
service decision making about maritime security from a US perspective (USC Title
10 requirement to: organize, train, equip). Additionally, the game served as a
vehicle for the War Gaming Department at the Naval War College to inductively
generate knowledge in order to develop hypotheses that can be tested in future
research. Research events in support of the game design can be found in Appendix
C.
For this qualitative, descriptive game, the emphasis of game design was to both
create a collegial atmosphere where the players could learn from each other, and to
enable the perspectives and experiences of the players to be recorded for subsequent
post-game analysis. Data was captured primarily through ethnographic (i.e.,
observed) collection by trained environmental recorders in the game cells and
auditorium plenary sessions, through the group products developed by the players in
the game cells and presented in the plenary sessions, and via self-declared player
data and insights garnered through web-based, individual player structured surveys.
At the conclusion of the game, the Data Collection and Analysis Team (DCAT)
applied a variety of qualitative tools and techniques to aggregate data and identify
key themes that may prove of interest to the sponsor for future research, policy
making, and resourcing purposes.
Collegial experience and individual surveys provided a rich understanding of the
perspectives of the individual international players. These perspectives provided
well-developed regional overviews where the area of focus was well represented by
international players. When the sub-region was not adequately represented, cell
focus became either blind or hyperopic. To correct for these defects and better
inform US maritime strategy and maritime security decision making, themes and
data developed through other research efforts are triangulated with data developed
in GMPG and deductively analyzed. The broad themes and implications from
several research paths become key trends, critical vectors, governing factors and
lenses that inform decision making at procurement and policy levels of government.
9
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3.2. Game Design. To foster a player environment favorable to collegial interaction, the
game was built around the perceived needs of the international participants (the game
schedule is available in Appendix D). GMPG was the first potentially large game where
the preponderance of the players was international by design. Invitations to over 100
countries for 2 players each created the opportunity for and necessitated planning for a
large event. In addition to designed international collaboration by players, a separate US
Government cell comprised of maritime stakeholders was expected to convene to listen
to and learn from the efforts of the international players.
The size of the international game cells was crafted to encourage robust dialogue in the
cell. Game cell size was targeted in the 10-12 player range, with a minimum of 7 and a
maximum of 14 as design parameters. The small size encouraged participation by all
players while providing social space to fit the acknowledged diverse cultural norms of
the players. English was designated as the language for all events and appropriate
language skills were requested of each international participant to enable the players to
dialogue collegially without the additional burden of language translation.
Each country was asked to send two players at the navy commander - captain, or army
lieutenant colonel - colonel (action officer) level to the game. Each was requested to be
an MDA subject matter expert, with one player a member of the navy or coast guard
(maritime services) and the second player from another government agency that is either
a key contributor to MDA or key consumer of MDA information (e.g. customs, border
security, port authorities, fisheries, maritime industry oversight, etc.).
Forty-six countries sent 83 players to the game. Two countries sent 4 participants, four
countries sent 3 participants, twenty-three countries sent 2 participants and seventeen
countries sent 1 participant. Less than 10 percent of players were from outside the
navy/coast guard (maritime agency) of their country. Of those outside players, most
were from border/customs agencies. During the game the broad collegiality of the
maritime services--sailors with common experience on the sea--was a noted asset;
however, the additional intent to focus on the broad MDA process within and across
counties—most MDA activity happens on land—was perhaps muted by the homogenous
nature of the players.
In addition to the 2 players in the international game cells from the United States, a
separate US cell was comprised of 34 players representing maritime stakeholders with
MDA equities from across the agencies of the government. This ‗whole of government‘
cell was foremost chartered to engage in ‗active listening‘ throughout the week and
convey to the international participants that the United States was sincerely listening to
their issues, concerns and recommendations. Having thoughtfully considered the
international perspectives and input, the U.S. cell would begin to articulate the potential
Title 10 implications of the international recommendations for the U.S. maritime
services, and particularly the U.S. Navy. Of note, due to travel requirements and other
personal scheduling issues, when the U.S. cell convened after the completion of the
10
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game to consider broader implications from the game, only half (16/34) of game
participants were in attendance.
The week was divided into three broad phases. In the first phase the players focused on
the current state of the maritime environment, both issues and implemented solutions. In
the second phase players built from the current set of maritime partnerships, information
sharing regimes and MDA to develop better solutions to maritime problems and nearterm recommendations for solution implementation. Immediately following the
conclusion of the game, players had the opportunity in the third phase to attend an MDA
technology symposium.
Phase 1 began on Sunday. Players were welcomed at a luncheon and received overview
briefings about the week ahead. Following the briefings, players were grouped into their
prospective game cells with moderators to conduct initial introductions and complete
initial individual baseline surveys. Additionally, the moderator introduced the expected
focus issue for initial cell work in phase 2 and determined if all players had an affinity
for participation. Phase 1 continued on Monday with regionally focused briefings on
current implementations of maritime partnerships, information sharing regimes and
MDA presented by current regional participants in those activities.
Phase 2 consisted of small cell seminar work by the player teams and large group
plenary panel presentations to present cell results to all participants. On Tuesday,
Wednesday and Thursday, seminars were led by an NWC moderator and assisted by an
NWC facilitator to produce templated briefing products for plenary panel discussions.
The plenary presentation product constituted the primary analytical output for the cell.
At the conclusion of the seminar session, players took individual web-based surveys
covering their seminar‘s work.
Phase 2 plenary panel discussions were included to enable broad sharing of the work
done in individual seminars. Game Control focused plenary panel sessions on specific
areas of interest from across the player cells. These sessions not only enabled broad
dissemination of the recommendations from the seminars, but also enabled constructive
criticism and inclusion of additional ideas from the broader audience. The Friday
morning plenary panel was attended by VADM Dorsett, USN, OPNAV N2/N6, and he
made concluding remarks at the end of the game to wrap-up the event and provide
thanks to the players for their work. Player out briefs are available in Appendix E.
Phase 3 introduced various MDA technologies to the participants on Friday afternoon.
In short, group presentations in the auditorium, presenters demonstrated their technology
to participants. Additionally, some technology solutions were presented in smaller room
settings. The purpose was to demonstrate options available and not to market or endorse
any specific technologies. Presentations were made by bith U.S. and international
organizations. The technologies presented and the detailed descriptions of the overall
game design are found in Appendix F and Appendix G.
11
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3.3. Analytic Framing. The overall analytic framing of the Global Maritime Partnerships
Game 2010 consisted of an inductive, qualitative-descriptive process. The post-game
analytic methodology follows a widely-used process referred to as triangulation. Current
thinking in the field of social research suggests that a variety of analytic tools should be
employed in behaviorally based activities such as war games, thus maximizing the
credibility of the work. One widely accepted methodology that takes advantage of
multiple techniques is triangulation. This approach allows the researcher to derive the
same or very similar conclusions using different datasets or methods. Much of the
strength of triangulation stems from its ability to distinguish between the
idiosyncratic…and the representative. Moreover, this method also allows the researcher
to base inquiry in the assumptions being used and evaluate questions with the
appropriate methodology, rather than the methodology driving the evaluation.
Consistent with this approach, the thirteen data streams collected during this game (see
Appendix H for details) incorporated a variety of research procedures into subsequent
analysis. A brief description of each analytic tool follows.
Content Analysis: Described as a method whereby a researcher seeks objectively
to describe the content of communication messages that people have previously
produced, this approach involves identifying coherent and important examples and
patterns in the data and subdividing data into coherent categories, patterns, and
themes, as supported by player actions, comments, or White Cell assessment.
Grounded Theory: A more detailed and methodologically sound approach to
analysis than the initial step of content analysis, grounded theory employs systematic,
hierarchical procedures to develop inductively derived theory grounded in data.
Grounded theory directs researchers to look for patterns in data so that they can make
general statements about the examined data. For the purposes of this game‘s analysis,
the Data Collection and Analysis Team employed an inductive, theory discovery
methodology that allowed the researchers to develop a theoretical account of the
general features of a topic while simultaneously grounding the account in empirical
observations or data.
Data Visualization: Post game, by comparing and contrasting the players‘
activities in the areas of maritime security, stability operations, and building
partnerships within the context of capabilities, benefits, and intended consequences,
overlapping the Venn diagrams produced in the seminar game cells and developing
link charts in i2 Text Chart and Analyst‘s Notebook, respectively, the Data Collection
and Analysis Team was able to identify gaps, seams, and overlaps in U.S. Navy
actions supporting other nations and organizations.
3.4. Collection Approach. The GMPG was constructed in a manner that ensured the
overarching research question was adequately addressed. In order to do so, thirteen data
streams were collected during the game. (see Appendix H for details).
12
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These thirteen data streams analyzed in this game were deemed descriptive because they
revealed the nature of certain situations, settings, processes, relationships and systems.
Accordingly, they were aggregated and assessed in order to clarify the information that
has been gathered. Lastly, quality assurance/quality control of the eleven international
player cells and one U.S. cell datasets was conducted in order to ensure that consistency
for coding and grounded induction was present.
3.5. Identification of Independent and Dependent Variables. The independent variables
in this game are the impediments to forming partnerships at the sub-regional, regional
and cross-regional levels, while the primary dependent variables are the solutions to
forming partnerships at the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels.
3.6. Definition of Key Term.
Catalyst to Instability - For the purposes of this game, catalyst to instability is defined as
anything that initiates, accelerates, or causes an event or series of events to adversely
impact the safety, security, economy, or environment of a nation, region, or superregion.

13
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4. ANALYSIS & RESULTS
4.1. Themes, Insights & Implications
Players, through an inductive reasoning process, derived a number of themes throughout
the game and combined them on the final day of game play. Then, the analysis team
utilized a grounded theory approach whereby themes were identified through a process
of constant comparison and then tested throughout the data. The analysis team
developed the implications and recommendations by exploring these player-derived
themes and linking them to current literature in the area of international cooperation and
information sharing (see Appendix I for sub-region/region cell analysis). Based on data
grounded from the international participants during the game, this method attempts to
inform leaders on the U.S. Navy‘s approach to maritime security cooperation and
Maritime Domain Awareness.
The insights discussed here result from an inductive reasoning approach and do not test a
conclusive set of hypothetical actions that could be executed in a different context – for
instance, in the real world or even in other scenarios. The underlying maritime issues,
partnership linkages, and supporting activities were developed by experts with a
significant understanding of the region and functional areas that were broad in nature
and intend to inform Navy decisions concerning organizing, training, , and equipping the
future Forces.
Elements of Effective Strategic Partnerships
The voluntary nature of partnerships was recognized by the players as a necessary
characteristic for effective cooperation among international partners. Partnerships can
only occur as a result of an agreement, whether implied or formal, between two or more
parties. Voluntary partnerships were noted by the players as a ―self-organizing process
based on shared purpose and mutual trust.‖
A common purpose or issue is needed as a pillar to forging new partnerships and
maintaining existing ones. This common purpose is formulated based on clear, common
goals and must be mutually agreeable to all of the stakeholders involved. Participants
recognized the value of understanding the goals, motivations and approaches of all
individual nations within the context of maritime security and information sharing. One
regional cell was unwilling to establish new partnerships in the game without the
presence of other nations in the region. Having all parties involved ―early and often‖ was
essential to optimizing the benefit of sharing information.
Trust between all parties involved was derived as the foundation for enduring
partnerships. Mutual trust significantly encourages the sharing of information and
development of partnerships. The development of trust was viewed by the players as a
long-term process unbounded by any certain period of time. ―As time goes on, and a
greater level of trust has been established, the sensitivity of data shared will also
14
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increase.‖ Trust was also believed to influence the confidence level between partners of
their ability to safeguard and protect data across classification levels. Enhancing trust
and partnerships between nations allows for disparate parties to coalesce into a
cooperative security framework, increasing the number of beneficiaries and partners.
Leveraging cooperative security frameworks in the maritime environment was highly
desired and welcomed by all of the players. There was no single model found or
developed that could be used in forming partnerships at the national, sub-regional,
regional or cross-regional levels. Many of the cooperative models that exist are centered
on addressing a specific catalyst to instability or maritime issue. More players were
inclined to using an existing regional cooperative framework as a mechanism for sharing
information and forging new partnerships, rather than developing a new model.
Substantial support from organizations such as the IMO in assisting in the development
of common standards, procedures and protocols for technology integration, data sharing
processes, and classification levels was required. It was also recognized that there is a
―long, drawn-out, time consuming political process‖ that accompanies this supportive
mechanism. The IMO was viewed as a necessary component in the long term stability
and standardization of information sharing efforts at the regional and cross regional
levels.
95% of players concluded that commonly developed and agreed upon norms, decision
rules, procedures, standards and protocols for information sharing at the national, subregional, regional and cross-regional levels would assist their respective countries and
regions to effectively address the demands and challenges it encounters in the maritime
environment. Throughout the game, the GMPG participants recognized that the lack of
information sharing and coordination at the national, sub-regional, regional and crossregional levels is due to the lack of standardization of processes, procedures and
protocols for MDA networks, data exchange, and data classification. Standardization
would help the coordination problem by forcing all parties to make mutually consistent
decisions while realizing mutual gains. Competing definitions for information and
intelligence were brought up often during the game as a major issue for sharing
information. An international regime can serve simply as an activity (PSI) or formal
organization (NATO) in which stakeholders (e.g., people, organizations, and nations)
can realize those mutual gains, but only by making mutually consistent decisions.
When establishing an information sharing or maritime security initiative at any level,
players leaned more towards the use of formal agreements, contracts or treaties. The
lack of standardization in each of the areas identified by the players was attributed to
national laws, regulations and policies governing various matters such as economic
―trade-secrets‖ (e.g. cargo manifest) , personal privacy (e.g., crew list) and national
security (e.g. military vessels). These types of formal agreements were said to instill a
stronger commitment to share because of the ―political top-cover‖ provided by
individual nations. Formal agreements enable parties to understand and accept the
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reciprocal duties, responsibilities, and purposes of those involved. Within each of the
partnerships identified during the game, players determined there appeared to be
sufficient national and international legal frameworks in place to support the
development of partnerships initiatives. In order to overcome the legal barriers to
information sharing and maritime security operations, players concluded that individual
nations should align domestic legislation with international norms through the adoption
of international regulations. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy
and Armed Groups in Southeast Asia and the Proliferation Security Initiative were noted
by the players as ways which national legislation can be leveraged in support of
maritime security cooperation. As a result, maritime stakeholders would garner shared
awareness and knowledge of the maritime domain.
Shared awareness and knowledge was a common theme that emerged from the game.
Knowledge sharing was an activity through which knowledge is exchanged among
individuals, organizations or countries. Specifically, knowledge sharing was noted
within the context of information (data), skills, and expertise acquired through
education, training or experience. Accordingly, there was a strong emphasis on nontechnology aspects of partnership building, such as leveraging existing education,
training, exercises and games as a mechanism for advancing partnerships and MDA.
Specifically, the structure of these events should be tailored more at the sub-regional and
regional levels with broad participation from military, civilian and industry stakeholders.
Throughout the game, there was a need to bridge the gap between disparate knowledge
to enable collaboration in the maritime environment. Specifically, players learned about
a variety of MDA and partnership initiatives that currently exist cross-regionally but,
surprisingly, even though these initiatives existed within their own sub-regions and
regions, they were unaware of the effort. Enhancing cooperation and coordination
through the execution of these initiatives at all levels is critical to maximizing the
sharing of data. Within this context of disparate knowledge, sea-blindness was defined
by the players, as ―a lack of political and public focus and understanding of important
maritime issues, resulting in the maritime domain receiving low priority without
appreciation for the consequences of neglect.‖ The lack of political awareness of these
issues was derived as a primary reason for the limited amount of capacity and
capabilities of nations to effectively address the diverse challenges encountered in the
maritime environment.
The lack of resources and funding significantly impairs sharing data and performing
maritime security operations in the real world. Specific capacity building opportunities
that emerged from the game included the procurement and installation of MDA
infrastructure (shore radar, communications, port facilities, coordination centers,
laboratory facilities, fixed and portable equipment), operational assets (e.g., patrol
vessels and aircraft), and education and training opportunities for both individual
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personnel and organizations. The sustainment of robust programs and funding is an
essential pillar to fostering continued growth of maritime security partnerships.
The Role of technology in maritime cooperation was approached as an impediment to
information sharing that is ―simplest to overcome‖. However, while players felt that a
bottom-up approach is essential to maximizing the amount of information contributed to
MDA at the regional and cross-regional levels, they were still very much in support of
establishing cross-regional information sharing linkages. Across all of the cells, players
concluded that the amount of existing regional and trans-regional technologies were
adequate to share unclassified data. Some regional cells still identified a strong desire for
obtaining additional technological resources specifically in the areas of systems
integration fusion and analysis and Common Operating Pictures (COP).
The Range of Cooperative Strategies for Achieving Efficacy in MDA
Players asserted that maximizing the contribution to Maritime Domain Awareness
requires ―more of a bottom-up than top-down approach.‖ A greater emphasis at the subregional and regional levels held true across all of the regional player cells. Specifically,
the players felt that in order to share the full spectrum of maritime information at the
sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels, individual nations need to solve their
domestic information sharing issues first, then systematically work towards the subregional and regional levels. Players noted that most domestic and international
information sharing partnerships are established as bilateral agreements. Individual
player surveys indicated that 91% of the participants believed, ―based on three days of
game play and reflection that the best solution to information sharing at the regional
level is through multilateral agreements.‖ Similarly, 95% of the players indicated,
―Based on three days of game play and reflection that the best solution to information
sharing at the cross-regional level is through multilateral agreements.‖
The game data showed through derivation that as the geographical scope of partnerships
expands, the greatest contribution to Maritime Domain Awareness comes from
expanding relationships and agreements from bilateral into multi-lateral. Players noted
that mil-mil relationships often initiate these partnerships. The use of Navy LNO‘s and
FAO‘s were highly desired and welcomed by majority of the players. Players concluded
that an expansion of personnel in these roles would help meet the demands for
establishing and enhancing partnerships worldwide. However, players concluded that the
key to long term stability and cooperation is through diplomatic and political
relationships. The primary, long-term cooperative strategy to forming partnerships
derived from the game, whether through bilateral or multilateral arrangements, was
formal in nature. Players discussed this formality in terms of agreements, contracts, and
treaties coupled with the use of national and international laws as necessary
characteristics to establishing partnerships at any level.
Players repeatedly recognized various national capability gaps and barriers to conducting
Maritime Domain Awareness and broader maritime security operations such as trust,
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technology interoperability, legislation, corruption, standard protocols and procedures.
Moreover, the maturity level of interagency cooperation varied considerably across the
wide range of participants. Even through the structure of the game required the players
to operate within a certain geographical area; the players demonstrated a strong desire
and commitment to continue pursuing cross-regional partnership initiatives, and as an
example stated ―considering that no one-size-fits-all solution exists in maritime security
cooperation, maritime stakeholders should continue pursuing a holistic approach to
examining the specific challenges and stressors, social, cultural and legal phenomenon‘s
that are unique at the sub-regional and regional levels.‖
4.2. Title 10 Implications
U.S. participants were asked to provide specific actionable recommendations for U.S.
Navy Title 10 (organize, train and equip) responsibilities at the sub-regional, regional, or
cross-regional levels. The section below discusses the overarching recommendations.
Organize
Since 2005, the Global Maritime Partnerships Initiative has been well received
from the international community and is still taking on a life of its own. Since its
inception, the increase in multilateral cooperation in maritime security affairs has
expanded across every region of the world. Nations have united both functionally
and geographically to develop stronger partnerships by sharing maritime
information in order to effectively address the catalysts to instability encountered
in the maritime environment. Work in this area should continue.
Establish sub-regional and regional liaison teams, assigned and manned by Naval
Component Commands (NCCs), to provide persistent engagement in support of
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, environmental response and search and rescue
operations.
Establish Regional Maritime Operations Centers (RMOCs) in support of
international maritime community interests.
Integration of information
operations, international shipping companies, and multi-agency representation
was noted as essential to ‗Integration . . . . was noted as essential‘ to enable
effective regional efforts.
Define Maritime Security Operations and develop concepts of operations,
doctrine and TTPs to perform various maritime security mission sets. Close
collaboration with the USCG is vital to this effort. The project should build upon
the CNO‘s Innovation Continuum Effort that examined Irregular Challenges in
2009.
Incorporate overarching strategic guidance on theater security cooperation and
global maritime partnerships into MDA Concept and CONOPS documents. Both
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should focus more on the governance and strategy of MDA at the sub-regional
and regional levels.
o International norms, decision rules, and procedures for sharing maritime
related information at the cross-regional level, once developed, should be
critical components of the U.S. MDA Concept.
Train
Education is a key element for bridging the partnership gaps of U.S. and
international participants at the sub-regional, regional and cross regional levels.
The participants expressed a lack of knowledge of existing partnerships initiatives
and specific lessons identified during the GMPG. The development of an online,
interactive, professional maritime education initiative at the operational and
strategic levels for U.S and international military, civilian and industry maritime
stakeholders was recommended.
Additionally, U.S. players proposed developing a curriculum focused on maritime
security (CTF Organization and Operations, MOC Watchstanding Procedures,
MDA Principles and Procedures, Maritime Law Enforcement, Area Search
Procedures, etc.) for U.S. Navy personnel. Naval Education and Training Security
Assistance Field Activity (NETSAFA) was noted as one potential means for
developing this educational and training initiative.
Leverage the existing Partnership Stations and existing bilateral and multilateral
exercises to address as many maritime security issues as possible.
Increase interagency representation during training exercises. Specifically,
incorporate civilian elements into exercises to foster synergy among international
maritime stakeholders and better understanding specific roles, responsibilities and
capabilities of each organization.
Equip
Increase funding for the relational aspects of partnership building (games,
exercises, training, and symposiums).
Provide funding for maritime operation centers and MDA technology at the subregional, regional and cross-regional levels. Continue support to existing centers
and technical infrastructures to improve information sharing processes and
classification restrictions.
Provide additional funding and personnel in Foreign Disclosure Office programs.
Additionally, expand and integrate FAO and LNO programs. In doing so, the
process should be coordinated with DOS, DoD and CCDR representatives.
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Examine the U.S. Navy‘s role, responsibilities, capabilities, and strategy for
achieving efficacy in MDA at the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels.
Accordingly, in order to develop commonly agreed upon norms, decision rules
and processes at the national level, players concluded that a long term U.S. MDA
research project be funded.
4.3. Limitations of Game Design and Analysis
One of the greatest challenges for the Naval War College, War Gaming Department is
to develop a game that provides the robust insights into an issue or problem sought by
the game‘s sponsor. Accordingly, managing stakeholder expectations about what the
final game report will tell them with respect to broad-based implications is essential.
Stakeholders often seek findings that will provide them with predictive conclusions
for decision-making purposes. Unfortunately, gaming is a predominately descriptive
process because games are not experiments. Even if a game is repeated, it lacks
sufficient controls over player inputs and the central limit theorem for a distribution
to ensure validity. In other words, sponsors should not attempt to draw inferences
beyond what a specific group of players did in a particular game to yield
generalizability (i.e., the ability to apply the findings observed for a small population
to the broader world around us).
Such is the case in the Global Maritime Partnerships Game 2010. This project was
designed to be a highly inductive, lightly structured project analyzed primarily using
open-ended, qualitative techniques. Specific themes were discerned as a result of
post-game analysis, and gaps, overlaps, seams, and outliers were identified using
grounded induction, content analysis, and data visualization. However, no
inferentiality or generalizability can be assumed based on the results of this game.
The value gained from the interpretation of insights derived from game play results
from the ability to develop new kernels of theories concerning partnerships and
information sharing. From these new theories, hypotheses about implementing future
cooperative security and information sharing models can be constructed and tested in
future research efforts, such as through gaming. In this way, the inductive process
conducting during the Global Maritime Partnerships Game 2010 will set the
conditions to be tested in future deductive processes and games.
Analysis effectiveness of a research effort, such as this game, can be measured in
terms of the internal and external validity of the analysis. Internal validity refers to
the extent that cause-and-effect relationships identified in the game can be inferred
from collected data. External validity refers to the extent that the results in the game
accurately reflect the external conditions in the real-world. A number of potential
threats to internal and external validity need to be accounted for and the analysis
effort must attempt to minimize the effect of these threats.
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Two threats to internal validity were the quality of the data collected and the accuracy
of the analytical technique used to review the data. To ensure quality data collection,
the analysis team primarily relied on player presentations. These deliverables were
captured via Microsoft PowerPoint and i2 Analyst Notebook during the discussions
of the players participating in a collaborative effort. The highly qualitative case study
research method uses the participants‘ own words to provide data for analysis.
Insights extracted from ethnographic recordings were then cross-checked
(triangulation method of using multiple data sets) with other data sets collected during
the game to ensure accuracy and conclusiveness. To ensure the correct analytical
technique was used, multiple methods and tools were employed (triangulation method
of using multiple techniques) to review the same data. These methods were content
analysis, grounded theory, and data visualization. Although internal validity threat
mitigation strategies were used, the greatest limitation to developing insights and
themes from the data resulted from the limited representation of regions as well as the
diversity of the backgrounds of participants. Their different lexicons and perspectives
of the same situation, often including the use of English as a second language, add a
level of difficulty to interpretation.
To explore the degree of external validity, one must ask whether the data allows
generalization to other subjects among the population. To answer this inquiry, one
must then look at the demographics data of the participants along with the specific
cultural, social, economic and political phenomena tailored at the national and subregional levels. The game was designed to inspire innovative thinking given the
complex nature of issues encountered in the maritime domain.
4.4. International Participant Demographics
There were 83 international participants from 46 different countries. 73 out of the 83
participants successfully completed the individual player surveys. The average
participant was approximately 46 years old and had approximately 25 years of
service. The participants were overwhelmingly male (72 out of 73) and were
predominantly military (69 out of 73). Moreover, the median (25 years of service) is
described as the numeric value separating the higher half of the sample population
from the lower half.
The intent of this game was to focus at the operational to strategic level of maritime
security cooperation. Therefore, it was desired for senior level participation from
civilian and military organizations both in the U.S and internationally. All of the
participants were college graduates with 60 percent reporting graduate degrees. 64
percent of participants reported having attended a naval war college as part of their
professional education, either in their own country or another nation.
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3%
13%

1%

23%%
36%

Yes
64%

60%%

Figures 3.2

No

Figures 3.3

Figures 3.2 and 3.3 depict the highest education level and participation at a war college as part of
professional military education respectively.

Functional Area

Number of
Participants

Surface

Average Years
Experience
27

26

Law Enforcement

5

22.5

Staff

3

25

C4 ISR

2

27

Expeditionary

1

27

Anti-Surface

3

30

Operations

8

27

Aviation

1

19

Maritime Domain Awareness

6

17

Executive/Policy

7

24

Technical

2

35

Academia

1

41
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Other

7

18

Table 3.4 depicts a breakdown of the participants relative to functional expertise with average years of
experience for each functional area. Although the average years experience for MDA experts were
relatively low, players seemed well versed in the range of information sharing partnerships and initiatives
that exists within their respective regions.

Country

# of players

Country

# of
players

African Union

1

Japan

4

Argentina

1

Kenya

1

Australia

1

Lebanon

1

Azerbaijan

2

Libya

2

Benin

2

Mexico

2

Brazil

3

Morocco

2

Bulgaria

2

Netherlands

1

Cameroon

2

New Zealand

1

Canada

2

Nigeria

1

Chile

3

Oman

2

Colombia

2

Pakistan

2

Ecuador

2

Panama

1

Egypt

1

Peru

1

France

1

Poland

1

Gabon

2

Saudi Arabia

3

Georgia

1

Senegal

2

Germany

2

Singapore

3

Ghana

2

Spain

2

Greece

1

Sweden

3

Guatemala

2

Tanzania

2
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India

1

Togo

2

Israel

1

Turkey

2

Italy

1

Ukraine

2

United Kingdom

2

Figure 3.5 depicts the diversity of countries and subsequent number of players involved in this
research project.

4.5. U.S. Participant Demographics
There were 34 U.S. participants from various military services, USG agencies, and
civilian organizations in this game. 28 out of the 34 U.S. participants successfully
completed the individual player surveys. The average participant was approximately
48 years old and had approximately 26 years of service. The participants were
overwhelmingly male (26 out of 28) and were predominantly military (21 out of 28).
Moreover, the median (26 years of service) is described as the numeric value
separating the higher half of the sample population from the lower half.

USN

6%
12%

USAF

29%

USCG
29%

3%
9%

Figure 3.6

12%

COCOMS
USG Agency
Industry

Figure 3.6 depicts the distribution of military service, USG agency, and civilian organizations .

The intent of this game was to focus at the operational to strategic level of maritime
security cooperation. Therefore, it was desired for senior level participation from
civilian and military organizations both in the U.S and internationally. The majority
of the U.S. participants were college graduates with 71 percent reporting graduate
degrees. Most, 54 percent, of participants reported having attended a naval war
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college as part of their professional education, either in their own country or another
nation.
4%

High School

7%
54%

71%

Bachelors
Degree

54%
46%

Graduate
Degree

Yes
No

Juris Doctorate
Figure 3.7

Figure 3.8

Figures 3.7 and 3.8 depict the highest education level and participation at a war college as part of
professional military education respectively.

For the purposes of this game, the following definitions for regional and cultural were
provided to the players.
Regional Expertise: Basis of credibility of a person who is perceived to be
knowledgeable in an area pertaining to a specific geographical location due to his
or her study, training, or experience in the subject matter.
Cultural Expertise: Basis of credibility of a person who is perceived to be
knowledgeable in the social heritage of a group (organized community or society)
due to his or her study, training, or experience in the subject matter. Specifically,
culture is a pattern of responses discovered, developed, or invented during the
group's history of handling problems which arise from interactions among its
members, and between them and their environment. These responses are
considered the correct way to perceive, feel, think, and act, and are passed on to
the new members through immersion and teaching. Culture determines what is
acceptable or unacceptable, important or unimportant, right or wrong, workable or
unworkable. It encompasses all learned and shared, explicit or tacit, assumptions,
beliefs, knowledge, norms, and values, as well as attitudes, behavior, dress, and
language.
The Majority of the participants (25 out of the 28) reported having regional expertise.
However, only 57% of the participants reported having cultural expertise. Players
reported having a broad range of regional and cultural expertise. Players reported
having more expertise in the South and Central American region.
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Europe

Europe
14%

14%

18%
39%
14%

6%
18%
South &
Central
America

35%
29%

South &
Central
America
Africa

Africa
12%
Figure 3.9

Figure 4.0

Figures 3.9 and 4.0 depict the regional and cultural areas expertise of the players.

Players were grouped according to there respective regional and cultual areas of
expertise. These cells were designed to mirror the international regional cells
employed in the game and operated independently of one another. Each cell
examined the observations, themes and receomndations from the international
counterparts in their respective regions. To compensate for minimal expertise in the
Middle East region (2), players with expertise in either Middle East or African affairs
were grouped togeather. The lack of player expertise across every region with the
exception of Latin America was a critical limitation of analysis.
Latin America
18%
41%

Europe
Middle East &
Africa

29%

Asia/Pcific

12%

Figure 4.1
Figure 4.1 depicts the composition of the U.S. player regional sub-cells. Of note, 14 players (41%) of the
total population comprised the Latin American cell.
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5. War Gaming Department Lessons Learned / Recommendations
5.1. Administration and Logistics
Lessons learned for the conduct of the Administration and Logistics portion of the
GMPG is available in Appendix J.
5.2. Future Events.
Background. Research throughout the past five years has indicated that the major
impediments to information sharing, both internally within a country or internationally
between countries has been the policy, legal and cultural issues vice the technological
solutions often discussed.
The realization of the fundamental concept that trust is essential to facilitate information
exchange was recognized on a large scale at the International Seapower Symposium
XIX held in Newport, Oct 2010. Based on this finding and the results of the events
described in Annex B, further study is warranted.
Recommendations. The following recommendations are submitted as a potential
research tract to facilitate a greater understanding of the issues/requirements for the
establishment of maritime domain awareness through maritime partnerships. The
recommended events are presented in two segments; first, a research path to improve
U.S. MDA options and second, to capitalize on the regional issues discovered and
facilitate greater cooperation between regional maritime forces.
5.2.1. Future Games – U.S. Centric
5.2.1. U.S. Interagency Game. The intent of the event is to focus on the two new core
capabilities from a Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. The U.S.
Maritime Forces need to coordinate and cooperate internally to determine what is
known and what can/should be shared. Interagency coordination is necessary for
optimal sharing and there are multiple sharing channels requiring coordination. The
Navy plays a key role in MDA, but is only one of many participants.
Domestic interagency challenges must be resolved in order to achieve the full
potential of global information sharing; additionally, an improved understanding of
interagency process is imperative in realizing the full potential of Navy capabilities.
The following is an example of U.S. Government agencies that currently operate, at
some level, information exchange ―systems‖ with their international counterparts
but don‘t always coordinate the information or intelligence garnered throughout
United States security channels.
Organizations, such as DOS/NTRG (Nuclear Trafficking Response Group),
DOS/DS (Diplomatic Security), DOE (Dept. of Energy), DHS/OPSP (Office of
Policy and Strategic Planning), DHS,/CBP (Customs and Border Protection),
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DHS/ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), DHS/USCG(CG-531) (Office
of Law Enforcement), DHS/USCG(CG-532) (Office of Counterterrorism & Defense
Operations), DHS/USCG(CG-0941) (Office Of Maritime/International Law), DOJ,
DOJ/FBI(MSP), DNI, HSC, NSC, DOD/JS/J5 (JAG), DOD/ASD(HD), DOD/JS/J3
(DDAT/HD) (Deputy Director for Anti-Terrorism and Homeland Defense),
DOD/OPNAV (N5SP) (Strategy/Policy Division),
DOD/USSTRATCOM,
DOD/NCIS, DOD/OPNAV (N3OP), DOD/FFC,
DOD/JFCOM/J9,
DOD/USNORTHCOM, should be considered for participation in the event.
Proposed Objectives:
Examine the Interagency Intelligence architecture
Examine the terrorist incident response architecture from law enforcement to
Federal response
Examine DOD and interagency coordination methodologies
Establish oversight considerations for national level information exchange
coordination
Determine release methodologies for shared awareness programs established
with regional partners
5.3. 5.2.2 Future Games – Regionally Centric.
The goal for improving national maritime capacity and to foster relationship
building can be achieved by providing regional gatherings for international
participants within their respective AOR. Similar to the approach conducted for
Eastern Africa with the Maritime Center of Excellence course of study, a one week
regional game will provide an opportunity for more senior decision makers than
were not available to travel to Newport, to gather, develop regional relationships
and reflect on the following objectives:
Examine and evaluate a coordination structure.
Define standardized nomenclature/definitions for maritime security and
humanitarian assistance mission areas.
Explore the processes for international cooperation.
Evaluate the current plans, agreements or procedures.
Examine legal authorities and jurisdictions.
Examine collaborative planning procedures to achieve a desired end state.
Based on the interactions during the GMPG, the following regions expressed a desire
to continue the research process:
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Gulf of Guinea Region.
Arabian Gulf Region.
Indian Ocean Region.
o Eastern Indian Ocean Region.
o Western Indian Ocean Region.
Mediterranean Sea Region.
Western Pacific Region.
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Appendix A (N/A)
Appendix B
GMPG Background Maritime Security Games
The Global Maritime Partnerships Game drew on the broad experiences from other NWC
games over the past several years that focused on the maritime security challenges,
specifically:
Maritime Domain Awareness Connectivity Workshop, Global 2008,
International Seapower Symposium (ISS) XIX, Irregular Challenges Game 2010, MDA
Operational Game 2010 and Strategic SEALIFT 2010.
1. Maritime Domain Awareness Connectivity Workshop:
a. During the period of 28 – 30 August, 2007, the MDA Connectivity Workshop
convened to examine the following issues;
i. Sharing interests and drivers of other maritime forces
ii. Melding capabilities and capacities to maximize mission performance
iii. Improving information sharing in a common domain
b. The initial concept to develop a technology solution was superseded by issues of
policy, legality and trust between the international participants. Conclusions were
that it was impossible to ―surge‖ trust and relationships should be developed prior
to technological linkages.
2. Global 2008:
a. During the period 4-8 August 2008, the Navy‘s Title X War Game, Global ‘08,
was held at the Naval War College (NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island. The game
focused on developing insights regarding the capabilities, capacities, and risks
associated with implementation of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower (CS 21).
b. The observations and insights from the game were organized around seven
maritime themes which had relevance across all of the cells. Three of the seven
themes are briefly discussed below.
i. Maritime Security: Game participants unanimously saw maritime security
as an important mission, and it was a central focal point of game
discussions. International players, in particular, considered maritime
security primarily a law-enforcement rather than a counterterrorism
function. Many of the participants also preferred U.S. assistance in the
form of training and exercises. Finally, most participants perceived the
facilitation of maritime security as an activity that could be leveraged to
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enhance trust between the U.S. maritime services and their counterparts in
other countries.
ii. Building Partnerships: For game participants, building partnerships meant
developing relationships with allies, friends, and stakeholders across the
full spectrum of maritime activities in order to create trust and effectively
accomplish shared maritime goals. They applied this concept of
partnership across all regions, futures, and the full range of maritime
activities, indicating that foreign partners wanted the U.S. to be involved
with their maritime security in most conceivable futures. From that
perspective, the participants noted that the United States will have to make
significant investments in maritime resources on a global basis to build
partnerships that meet the expectations of existing and potential partners.
As participants and others have stated, ―you can’t surge trust.‖ Building
partnerships will accordingly require tolerance, patience, and some
willingness to adapt and conform to partner standards.
iii. Shared Awareness: Virtually all of the players viewed information sharing
between stakeholders (both governmental and non-governmental agencies
and organizations) as vital to the development of improved situational
awareness. They came up with five primary insights regarding shared
awareness. First, information sharing is a key enabler, particularly for
information-related concepts such as maritime domain awareness (MDA)
and common operational picture (COP). Second, the barriers to the
successful sharing and exchange of information are policy-related as well
as technical, such that policy changes – not just technological advances –
can lead to improved information sharing. Third, trust, developed through
engagement activities such as coalition exercises and operations, would
help expand the range and depth of interaction between the United States
and partner countries. Fourth, information sharing must be a two-way
street. Finally, ISR, particularly persistent ISR provided by maritime
forces, is a key maritime requirement.
3. International Seapower Symposium XIX – The ISS is a biennial symposium held on even
years to promote mutual understanding among the leaders of the world's maritime
nations.
a. During the period of 6-9 October 2010 ISS was conducted to raise awareness and
increase Navies‘ participation in Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). A focus
of ISS XIX was the improvement of MDA and the broadening of information
sharing between nations and navies in support of it. This was conducted through
the following objectives.
i. Endorse the importance of maritime domain awareness as a critical
enabler in building regional maritime safety and security.
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ii. Increase awareness of regional successes in maritime partnerships.
iii. Build mutual trust and cooperation, and highlight best practices to mitigate
and solve shared challenges.
iv. Positively impact perceptions toward maritime domain awareness and
enhance Navies willingness to share information as partners within their
regions.
b. The desired end state was a recognition of the need to take action on the
following:
i. To share information better and more widely,
ii. To better integrate separate initiatives against various maritime threats
(piracy, proliferation, trafficking, terror, illegal resource extraction, etc)
iii. To gain better understanding of how different partners plan and operate
through more cooperative training, exercises, and operations,
iv. To create quicker, better mechanisms for those with capacity and
capability resources to assist those who are still building, especially at a
basic level, and
v. To create or strengthen mechanisms for collective action where common
maritime interests exist.
c. Conclusions
i. Political will must take the lead, technology and implementation will
follow.
ii. In addressing ―sea-blindness‖ (ignorance of the importance of the sea) and
advancing cooperation and MDA, navies/maritime services should be
leading the efforts to educate their governments/interagencies/populace on
the importance of the maritime domain, the need to understand what is
occurring there, and the need to cooperate with others to achieve a secure
environment.
iii. The path to increased MDA starts at the national level. National efforts
are then integrated into regional networks. Substantial progress has been
made in several regions of the world over the past 2 years in this effort.
Trans-regional and global MDA will be achieved by expanding these
existing regional networks and linking them together.
4. Irregular Challenges 2010 Game
a. During the period 27-30 July 2010, the United States Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island hosted the Irregular Challenges 2010 Game. The
overarching purpose of the Irregular Challenges 2010 Game was to help the Navy
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better understand the complexity of the problems that it could face in unstable
regions in the maritime environment and to better address how it could respond.
b. The Irregular Challenges 2010 Game was structured to explore the following four
specific objectives:
i. Identify possible benefits and unintended consequences of U.S. Navy
activities in maritime instability-oriented irregular challenges pre-crisis;
ii. Identify possible benefits and unintended consequences of U.S. Navy
activities in maritime instability-oriented irregular challenges during a
crisis;
iii. Identify gaps, seams, and overlaps in U.S. Navy capabilities supporting
other nations and organizations in maritime instability-oriented operations;
iv. Provide an environment for players to explore and appreciate the
complexities of decision-making when faced with maritime instabilityoriented irregular challenges.
c. According to the players, attributes that describe an effective approach to
confronting irregular challenges include:
i. Being focused on complex and interconnected problems;
ii. Having the ability to address problems as a function of proper
understanding of the complexity of the environment;
iii. Having cultural expertise to help understand the complexity of the
environment;
iv. Awareness of available capabilities, both military and civilian, to better
understand how to address the problems;
v. Recognizing that problems are best addressed through pre-crisis activities;
vi. Working with interagency, non-government, and international partners in
order to address problems; and

vii. Conducting unique missions to address problems such as building
partnership capacity to conduct operations not normally associated with
security (such as humanitarian assistance and civil affairs).

34
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

5. MDA Operational Game 2010
a. In an effort to share ideas and initiatives that have been developed independently
across the globe, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Roughead,
stated during ISS XIX that an international game would be held at the Naval War
College to explore the operational implications of MDA. In July 2010, a game to
enhance information sharing with international partners for Maritime Domain
Awareness was held in McCarty Little Hall at the Naval War College in Newport,
Rhode Island.
b. The purpose of the event was to enhance information sharing with international
partners for Maritime Domain Awareness in order to support International
Seapower Symposium XX.
c. Game Objectives.
i. Examine regional MDA related relationships and networks in order to
identify key elements of success, commonalities, and best practices.
ii. Expose impediments to effective information sharing.
iii. Identify options for broad based international maritime information
sharing.
d. Commonalities discovered during the game
i. Maritime Domain Awareness is an accepted term.
ii. Reasons for sharing information are to receive information through
reciprocal sharing and improve capacity of sharing partners to take actions
which support one‘s own national objectives (e.g., to interrupt in their own
territory smuggling operations which affect both countries).
iii. Interoperability within an information sharing coalition must be voluntary
in nature. Rules for sharing must be equally applied to all members and
information assurance must be resolved to the satisfaction of each
member.
e. Impediments to information sharing.
i. Lack of a national interagency process creates internal and external
information sharing impediments.
ii. Integration of legacy systems and technologies has been a significant
internal challenge.
iii. Domestic legal and policy restrictions inhibit internal and external sharing.
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6. Strategic Sealift 2010
a. The SEALIFT 2010 Strategic Lift Game was conducted 2 - 6 August 2010 at the
Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
b. The intent for the game was to focus on the processes and procedures required to
mobilize and deploy forces, equipment, and sustainment via the Joint Deployment
and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) in support of Commander, United States
Africa Command‘s Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) efforts in Western
Africa as they support United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).
c. Objectives
i. Examine ―end-to-end‖ Department of Defense‘s (DOD) ability to support
USAFRICOM‘s FHA Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and
Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 7200 in Western Africa.
ii. Explore supporting relationships with partner nations, Governmental
Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, and other international
agencies as directed, to develop and coordinate non-combat support
operations.
d. Conclusions.
i. SEALIFT 2010 provided an excellent opportunity to explore the unique
and challenging interagency relationships encountered during an FHA
operation. The close coordination with USAID/OFDA throughout the
planning and execution of SEALIFT 2010 ensured the game related
realistic and believable lessons and real world experiences to all
participants.
Additionally, the game explored DoD-USAID/OFDA
interfaces and how the international relief community responds to DoD
involvement in crisis response, providing invaluable experience for all
participants.
7. Multilateral War Game 2010
a. The Multilateral War Game 2010 was conducted 13-17 Sept 2010 at the Naval
War College, Newport, R.I.
b. The game‘s intent was to increase cooperation and interoperability among the
navies of the participating nations and to examine issues of common concern in
order to develop compatible doctrine.
c. Objectives
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i. Examine the interaction between national-level political and military
representatives and operational-level military planners, operating within a
multinational context
ii. Examine the ability of a multinational force (MNF) to effectively perform
its assigned duties
iii. Examine the impact of differing individual national legal policies,
differing interpretations of international legal policies and agreements, and
their potential impact on MNF operations
iv. Examine military operational-level
operating within a multinational force

planning

considerations

when

d. Conclusions
i. Common understanding of MNF planning documents‘ terminology and
phraseology is important for planners with different planning
backgrounds.
ii. Assigning actual forces to a notional C2 organizational structure requires a
mature MNF ROE in order to consciously blend forces with varying
nationally-imposed ROE restrictions
iii. In addition to clear language translation concerns, an added complication
was a differing understanding of a properly translated term
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Appendix C
Research / Associated Events
Background. The United States Navy has embarked on an ambitious initiative to
implement a new maritime strategy. This is the first new Navy strategy that addresses the
post-Cold War and post-9/11 realities of global terrorism. The new strategy is consistent
with the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Maritime Security, as
well as with other national level guidance. As a key part of this strategy, the Global
Maritime Partnership (originally titled the 1000-ship Navy) is a key tenet of U.S. naval
policy.
The Navy must work seamlessly at sea with a wide range of
international/coalition partners. An impact to the requirements generation process for the
Navy will be to ensure coalition interoperability is considered at the earliest stages of
capability development.
Current and future efforts to bring about Global Maritime Partnerships must address the
ongoing challenge of information sharing or Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).
Information sharing will not only enhance the Navy‘s war fighting capabilities but will
also help the Navy meet the growing maritime security and humanitarian missions that
are an integral part of the new maritime strategy.
Information sharing and maritime partnerships create the environment to provide security
and stability against WMD proliferation, piracy, weapons, illegal immigration, slavery,
fishery violations and drugs in the maritime domain. That security and stability effects
the global economics.
Maritime partnerships are an international association of maritime nations that participate
in international commerce, each having a stake in security and freedom of the seas. The
partnerships are necessary to confront the complex shared challenges and to maintain
stability. Partners assist all countries in using the sea for lawful purposes including
commerce.
The purpose of the Global Maritime Partnerships Game (GMPG) was to identify the
catalysts to instability at the national, regional and super-regional levels as well as the
impediments to forming effective regional and global partnerships in the maritime
domain from both U.S. and international perspectives.
Research Tracks. Three perspectives were pursued to determine the regions, issues and
participating nations that should be considered for the Global Maritime Partnerships
Game. They targeted the Department of Defense, Nation States and US Interagency
organizations.
Track 1. Research was conducted within the Department of Defense for the U.S.
perspective on the event. OPNAV contacted the Combatant Commanders
38
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(CCDR), Naval Component Commands (NCC) and the Numbered Fleets to
explore maritime security issues that existed within the Areas of Responsibility
(AOR).
In addition, research trips were conducted to the Office of Naval Intelligence
(ONI) to conduct interviews with subject matter experts (SME) on maritime
regions and issues (catalysts to instability) to identify impediments to forming
effective regional and global partnerships within the maritime domain.
This data along with the OPNAV survey was consolidated and applied to the
construct of the Global Maritime Partnerships Game (as described in Appendix
G).
Track 2. Several international events were scheduled by the War Gaming
Department (WGD) of the Naval War College (NWC) that made possible a
research opportunity to examine issues and methodologies for application in the
design of the GMPG.
Baku, Azerbaijan – The purpose was to expose the Azeri Naval forces to the
operational planning process and putting into practice selected CONOPS to
counter the maritime threat to the critical energy infrastructure.
Mombasa, Kenya - Provide operational level training that builds Maritime
Safety and Security capacity in order to promote a stable and secure Africa
and set the conditions for the region to harness the maritime domain‘s
potential.
Montevideo, Uruguay - The purpose was to expose the Uruguayan Naval
forces to the operational planning process and putting into practice selected
CONOPS to counter maritime threats.
Cartagena, Colombia – The purpose was to achieve the goal of making the
navies of South America aware of the benefits of and enabling them to
participate in regional security initiatives. The additional goals of enhancing
understanding of how maritime domain awareness contributes to state and
regional maritime safety/security and fostering navies determined to connect
with partners and build maritime safety/security were a part of the game
design.
In addition, the process of determining linkages between information cells
was part of the experimental design of the event.
Track 3. Interagency organizations, though not part of the GMPG itself, were chosen to provide
input to the game objectives and context. They were interviewed to determine their perspectives
and relevant opinions on their global partnering regions, issues and concerns with a maritime
security nexus.
39
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Appendix D
GMPG Schedule of Events
Sunday 3 October
1030 – 1130

Buses drop off participants at Officer‘s Club

1030 – 1200

Participant Registration

1130 – 1300

Lunch

1130 – 1300

Welcome and Opening Remarks

1300 – 1400

Game Design Brief

1330 – 1430

Seminar Tables: Individual Paper Surveys / Break

1430 – 1500

Seminar Tables: Participant Introductions

1500 – 1630

Seminar Tables: Group Issue Development

1600 – 1700

Buses drop off participants at quarters

1700 – 1800

Game Control Team Meeting

1800 – 2300

Bus service to downtown Newport and quarters
Monday 4 October

0645 – 0730

Buses drop off participants at NWC McCarty Little Hall

0700 – 0800

Late Participant Registration

0700 – 0800

Breakfast

0800 – 0815

Administrative Remarks

0815 – 1000

Country Briefings (2) - Auditorium

1000 – 1030

Break

1030 – 1200

Country Briefings (2) - Auditorium

1200 – 1330

Lunch

1330 – 1500

Country Briefings (2) - Auditorium

1500 – 1530

Break

1530 – 1615

Country Briefing (1) – Auditorium

1615 – 1630

Move to Seminar Gaming Cells

1630 – 1700

Seminar Participant and Issue Introductions
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1700 – 1800

Buses drop off participants at quarters

1700 – 1800

Game Control Team Meeting

1800 – 2300

Bus service to downtown Newport and quarters
Tuesday, 5 October

0645 – 0730

Buses drop off participants at NWC McCarty Little Hall

0700 – 0800

Breakfast

0800 – 0815

Administrative Remarks – Game Cells

0815 – 1300

Seminar Working Groups – Game Cells

1000 – 1030

Coffee Service Available

1200 – 1330

Lunch

1100 – 1300

Control Cell Plenary Panel Determinations

1230 – 1330

Seminar Briefing Preparations – Game Cells

1330 – 1500

Plenary Panel Discussion One - Auditorium

1500 – 1530

Break

1530 – 1645

Plenary Panel Discussion Two - Auditorium

1645 – 1700

Administrative Remarks (Wednesday Seminar Assignments)

1700 – 1800

Buses drop off participants at quarters

1700 – 1800

Game Control Team Meeting

1800 – 2300

Bus service to downtown Newport and quarters
Wednesday, 6 October

0645 – 0730

Buses drop off participants at NWC McCarty Little Hall

0700 – 0800

Breakfast

0800 – 0815

Administrative Remarks – Game Cells

0815 – 1300

Seminar Working Groups – Game Cells

1000 – 1030

Coffee Service Available

1200 – 1330

Lunch

1100 – 1300

Control Cell Plenary Panel Determinations

1230 – 1330

Seminar Briefing Preparations – Game Cells

1330 – 1500

Plenary Panel Discussion Three - Auditorium
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1500 – 1530

Break

1530 – 1645

Plenary Panel Discussion Four - Auditorium

1645 – 1700

Administrative Remarks (Wednesday Seminar Assignments)

1700 – 1800

Buses drop off participants at quarters

1700 – 1800

Game Control Team Meeting

1800 – 2300

Bus service to downtown Newport and quarters
Thursday 7 October

0645 – 0730

Buses drop off participants at NWC McCarty Little Hall

0700 – 0800

Breakfast

0800 – 0815

Administrative Remarks – Game Cells

0815 – 1500

Seminar Working Groups – Game Cells

1000 – 1030

Coffee Service Available

1200 – 1330

Lunch

1300 – 1500

Control Cell Plenary Panel Determinations

1400 – 1530

Seminar Briefing Preparations – Game Cells

1500 – 1530

Break

1530 – 1645

Plenary Panel Discussion Five - Auditorium

1645 – 1700

Administrative Remarks (Wednesday Seminar Assignments)

1700 – 1800

Buses drop off participants at quarters

1700 – 1800

Game Control Team Meeting

1800 – 2300

Bus service to downtown Newport and quarters
Friday 8 October

0645 – 0730

Buses drop off participants at NWC McCarty Little Hall

0700 – 0800

Breakfast

0800 – 0815

US Seminar Presentation - Auditorium

0815 – 0945

Plenary Panel Discussion Six - Auditorium

0945 – 1015

Break / Coffee Service Available

1015 – 1145

Plenary Panel Discussion Seven – Auditorium
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1200 – 1300

Lunch – Officer‘s Club

1245 – 1315

Transition Remarks

1330 – 1630

Technology Symposium – McCarty Little Hall

1330 – 1530

US Seminar Plenary Session – Decision Support Center

1330 – 1530

War Gaming Department Plenary Session – MLH 110

1645 – 1700

Administrative Remarks (Wednesday Seminar Assignments)

1630 – 1730

Buses drop off participants at quarters

1800 – 2300

Bus service to downtown Newport and quarters
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Appendix E
GMPG Cell Outbriefs
Cell 1 - Mediterranean
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Cell 2 – Black Sea
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Cell 3 – Baltic Sea
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Cell 4 – Pacific
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Cell 5 – Indian Ocean
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Cell 6 – Did Not Exist
Cell 7 – South America
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Cell 8 – Pacific East
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Cell 9 – Gulf of Guinea
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Cell 10 – Gulf Of Guinea
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Cell 11 – Central America
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US Cell Observations
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Appendix F
Technology Symposium
Background. Throughout the development of the Global Maritime Partnerships Game, the
desire to investigate technological systems to facilitate information sharing was prevalent in
every discussion. As a result of the planning process, the design of the game was conducted as a
technologically agnostic event to allow the participants to investigate the legal, policy and
cultural implications to Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) as a precursor to actively
determining the preferred information exchange system.
The objective of the Technology Symposium was to expose GMPG participants to a variety of
international MDA technologies, and showcase selected regional MDA information sharing
initiatives. The technology initiatives that the War Gaming Department (WGD) selected were
to show the participants how they could rapidly deploy low cost sharing systems using existing
AIS data sources. The two sources of data that are currently available on line, for little and no
cost are the Maritime Safety & Security Information System (MSSIS) and the U.S. Department
of Transportation Maritime Administration‘s MarView. The national ―cost of admission‖ to
receive this data is simply to agree to share its own data into the system. Other systems
presented ideas on how to share data from commercial satellites.
Symposium. NWC did not want to endorse nor support any one system over another; therefore,
the symposium format provided organizations the opportunity to demonstrate their systems to
those interested. In short group presentations in the auditorium, presenters demonstrated their
technology to participants. Additionally, some technology solutions were presented in more
intimate room settings. The systems demonstrated during the Symposium were as follows (for a
brief description of each system see Annex 1 to Appendix H):
System
SUCBAS
C-SIGMA
VRMTC-A
SISTRAM

Cty
SWE
US
US
BZ

Organization
Swedish Navy
USCG
Naval Science Officer USSouthCom
Brazilian Navy

Marview
CAMTES
CAMTES
MSSIS

US
US
US
US

MARAD
GreenLineSystems
GreenLineSystems
DOT Volpe Center
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Annex 1 to Appendix F
Technology Symposium - Systems
CAMTES (iBench – Greenline Systems) – Computer Assisted Maritime Threat Evaluation
System
GreenLine iBenchTM helps analysts and decision-makers make better and more efficient
risk assessments and interdiction decisions. Complementing existing Command and
Control Systems (C2) with operational analysis, iBench is a comprehensive decisionsupport platform that leverages the different sub-sets of illicit, natural, and normal
maritime activities to provide a clearer understanding of the actors, assets and actions
occurring daily. By providing an unclassified and open-source backbone for information
sharing, iBench enhances MDA and MSA operations and assists in inter-agency and
coalition collaboration.
A computer-based threat evaluation system, together with any other complementary,
associated, supporting, or bundled programs, that will analyze ocean-going cargo vessels
for security implications in support of a comprehensive maritime domain awareness
effort. The system will utilize business rules developed in collaboration with
coalition/alliance partners, and approved by the US Navy, and access external data in
order to produce accurate, in-depth, and reliable threat evaluation and analysis as well as
realistic and practical recommendations for interdiction, boarding, or other appropriate
action.
C-SIGMA – Collaboration in Space for International Global Maritime Awareness
All maritime nations of the world, working together, can make the seas much safer and
more secure from wrong-doers, be they smugglers, polluters or pirates. One of the
primary steps the nations could take would be to create a global space partnership (GSP)
initially focused on the maritime domain using commercial and civil satellites.
This system intends to add significant situational awareness data to a common
operational picture on a global scale by combining terrestrial maritime surveillance
systems with commercial and civilian space systems having significant earth and ocean
observation capabilities. This capability would be distinct and totally separate from any
classified undertakings either now underway or planned and would have the huge benefit
of being able to be shared with all seafaring nations of the world.
MarView – Maritime View
The U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration is the owner of
MarView, an integrated data-driven environment providing essential information to
support the strategic requirement of the U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS) and
its contribution to the economic viability of the Nation. MarView provides the ability to
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fuse data together to create models and simulations for capacity planning, economic
impact analysis, on-demand forecasting, and plans for mitigating/reacting to emergency
situations.
MSSIS - The Maritime Safety and Security Information System
The Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS) is a freely-shared,
unclassified, near real-time data collection and distribution network. Its member countries
share data from Automatic Identification Systems, coastal radar, and other maritimerelated systems. MSSIS is intended to promote multilateral collaboration and datasharing among international participants, with a primary goal of increasing maritime
security and safety. Data sources may range from a single sensor to an entire national
vessel tracking network. MSSIS is perfectly suitable as a one-stop source for streaming
global maritime data. Because the data distributed by MSSIS maintains its original,
internationally recognized format and is delivered to users in near real time, member
organizations are able to utilize the data feed to meet their specific mission requirements.
SISTRAM – The Maritime Information Traffic System
The purpose of SISTRAM is to improve SAR efforts within the Brazilian maritime area.
This is accomplished by gathering navigational information from participating vessels.
This information is then used during an SAR effort to route nearby vessels to the scene.
The ability to quickly divert nearby vessels to the scene provides faster response than can
be provided from shore and increases the safety of life at sea. Its interlink with the AIS
project has improved the quality of information and increased the precision of followups, making them an important Command, Control and Intelligence (C²I) tool, as several
sources of information are integrated into the system in its constant evolution.
SUCBAS – Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea
The target for SUCBAS is to improve MSA in the heterogeneous environment of the
Baltic Sea. This presentation deals with the technology and how the cooperating
countries (without a common funding source) design, develop and implement new
functionality using agile principles and specifications from TIDE (Technology for
Information, Decision and Execution superiority).
SUCBAS is not a physical system or a machine. SUCBAS is a Maritime Domain
Awareness co-operation framework/process between countries in the Baltic Sea Area.
SUCBAS was aimed to develop a concept with a technical solution, in order to enhance
the Maritime Domain Awareness in the following areas: territorial integrity, safety,
environment and maritime economy, through sharing information between the agencies
and countries with an interest in the maritime domain.
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VRMTC-A – Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center – Americas
VRMTC-A is an interagency, multi-national project to integrate partner nation efforts
that address maritime threats in the Americas. This mission is accomplished through
information sharing using a regional network and fused COP, analysis through analytical
tools, anomaly detection and event monitoring, and collaboration through a suite of webbased tools.
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Appendix G
Game Methodology
1. The GMPG was a six day, international collegial event. The overall tenor and tone of the
event were designed to both showcase international perspectives and efforts in focus areas,
and present them in an atmosphere that encouraged friendship development and collaboration
at individual, group, country and regional levels. For the GMPG participants, this event was
an educational and collaborative event focused on maritime partnerships, information sharing
and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). MDA, while important, was primarily a focus
area that enabled a necessary narrowing of focus from the much broader possibilities of
maritime partnerships and information sharing that the participants might have otherwise
reasonably considered.
2. For the Naval War College, War Gaming Department, this event was analytical, with postevent analysis providing insight into the current status of maritime partnerships and
information sharing for the purpose of developing MDA that can better enable the CNO to
execute his Title X responsibilities in support of MDA as an enabler of critical naval
missions.
3. The GMPG took place 3 – 8 October 2010 at the Naval War College in Newport, RI and the
event week was divided into three general phases.
a. The first phase entailed establishing a collegial, collaborative atmosphere amongst the
participants and conducting dialogue to determine the primary maritime issues that are of
concern to participants. Additionally, various participants briefed the status of MDA
efforts that their country and region are pursuing. Team-building dialogue occurred on
Sunday and country MDA briefings were given on Monday. See Appendix A for a
listing of participants.
1) The second phase was an examination of the policies, processes and procedures
required to establish the information sharing and partnerships required to successfully
counter the maritime issues that had been developed in Phase 1. Phase 2 employed
the developed issues with additional scene-setting background information as
catalysts, enabling participants to work together in small-group seminars to mitigate
the identified issues and problems.
(a) On Tuesday, seminars individually developed operational-strategic level solutions
(i.e. policies, processes and procedures) to the specific issue/scene-setter and
presented those solutions in large-group plenary (selected seminars in moderated
panel discussions). Tuesday issues were focused at the sub-regional level (e.g.
Horn of Africa, Gulf of Guinea, and Strait of Malacca).
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(b) On Wednesday, seminars individually developed operational-strategic level
solutions (i.e. policies, processes and procedures) to the specific issue/scene-setter
and presented those solutions in large-group plenary (moderated panel
discussions). Wednesday issues were focused at the super-regional or functional
level (e.g. narcotics trafficking from South America via Africa to Europe;
narcotics trafficking from Makran Coast via Africa or Middle East to Europe;
piracy; Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) fishing; pollution; Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS)).
(c) On Thursday, seminars individually developed operational-strategic level
solutions to enable MDA on an ongoing, enduring basis across a range of
uncertain or changing issues and presented these solutions in large-group plenary,
moderated panel discussions on Thursday afternoon and Friday morning.
Thursday seminars were sized, grouped and focused on the near-term potential
way ahead for the participants. Additional key seminar deliverables included the
major impediments or problems that must be overcome and a recommended way
ahead including next steps and early success enablers. Thursday‘s plenary session
focused on major impediments and Friday morning plenary sessions focused on
the way ahead.
(d) A U.S. Government seminar with representation that is heavily Department of
Defense, but broadly inclusive of MDA stakeholders convened Tuesday through
Thursday in similar fashion to the international seminars. The responsibilities of
the US seminar were to:
(a) Listen to and interpret international participant's products and presentations to
gain additional understanding of international perspectives on various issues.
(b) Demonstrate an understanding of international perspectives through a plenary
presentation on Friday morning as a precursor to the way-ahead panel
discussions.
(c) Develop broad USG implications, based on the international presentations;
with a specific focus on the Title X implications for the US maritime services
(USN, USMC, USCG).
(d) On Friday afternoon, the USG seminar concluded in a separate plenary
session in the DSC in order to:
(i) Examine the international feedback to the US presentation that morning.
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(ii) Identify and capture additional understanding and insight based on the
international ways-ahead that were prepared in seminars on Thursday and
presented in panel discussion Friday morning.
(iii)Identify the Title X (USN/USMC/USCG) and broad USG implications of
the international way ahead.
(e) Upon completion of the USG plenary WebIQ session in the McCarty Little
Hall Decision Support Center, US participants adjourned to participate in the
Technology Symposium.
(e) On Friday afternoon, the NWC faculty and staff supporting the event seminars
and plenary sessions convened in plenary session to capture the impressions of the
moderators and facilitators of the event.
(a) Key insights on international perspectives.
(b) Broad USG implications.
(c) Title X implications for maritime services (USN/USMC/USCG).
(d) Recommendations for future areas of study and pathway events.
2) The third phase was an associated symposium. Following a GMPG concluding
luncheon on Friday, participants were encouraged in Phase 3 to participate in an
MDA Technology Symposium in McCarty Little Hall. The symposium consisted of
both auditorium presentations and trade-show type ‗booths‘ in the game cells around
the auditorium. The completion of the symposium concluded all events associated
with the GMPG.
b. On Monday morning, 11 October, War Gaming Department convened to hot-wash the
conduct of the GMPG and capture lessons for incorporation in future efforts.
4. Game Design
a. GPMG 2010 was conducted as a single-sided seminar-style analytical game with a
control cell.
1) International seminars consisted of small groups (ideally 8-10, maximum 14) of
international participants with an NWC moderator, facilitator and environmental
recorder. Two US participants were country players in the international seminars.
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2) The USG seminar was a larger group (30-45 planned personnel) of all other US
participants. They were moderated and facilitated by multiple NWC personnel to
develop required deliverables and capture necessary data for post-game analysis.
3) The Control Cell monitored the activities of the individual seminars in order to
modify the schedule as required, assist individual cells where needed, and determine
from the work being conducted in the cells the topics for, moderator(s) of, and
panelists for the various plenary sessions.
b. A simplified organizational structure overview is provided in figures 1 and 2.
Auditorium
Plenary Panel A-D-G w/M

Game Cells

Region D

Region A
Region G
Region A

Region C

Region B
Region F

Region G

Region B

Region E

USG Cell

Region C

Plenary Panel F-C-B w/M

Control
Region D

Region F

Region D

Region A
Region G

Region E

Region F

USG Cell

Region E

Fig 1. Tuesday / Thursday Organization
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Region C

USG Cell
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Fig 2. Wednesday / Thursday Organization
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5. Game Mechanics: The game broadly functioned to enable a collegial and collaborative
atmosphere for international participants. US participants were afforded the best opportunity
to observe collegially the work of their international colleagues. Seminars produced
templated briefing products for viewing by all participants. Individuals were asked
individual survey questions to gain additional or analytic insight into their perspective.
a. Phase 1
1) On Sunday, as designed, participants were to be grouped at tables with their seminar
moderator. Each participant was to complete a paper survey and the seminar
moderator would then complete an initial survey for the entire seminar. The
moderator would take additional notes to record key points and insights where
possible. A change in the schedule at the Officer‘s Club resulted in changes to the
design. Players were divided into their gaming seminars on Sunday and they were
able to take their initial surveys via computer web-based means vice paper surveys as
planned.
2) On Monday, environmental recorders participated in plenary session for the country
MDA presentations to capture additional discussion and insights. All NWC
personnel were encouraged to capture key items for data analysis.
b. Phase 2
1) On Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, seminars were led by an NWC moderator
and assisted by an NWC facilitator to produce a template briefing product for plenary
panel discussion. The plenary output product constituted the primary analytical
output for the cell. Additionally, moderator, facilitator and data collector notes
captured additional information about the process of producing the cell output (where
possible). Toward the end of the seminar session, players took individual player
surveys via computer (most players). The Control Cell viewed intermediate or
working products as they were developed to assist in determining topics for plenary
panel presentation.
2) The Control Cell designated the plenary panel topic and the NWC panel moderator.
Designated participants (briefers), chosen by their seminar, participated as panelists in
the plenary panels and presented the seminar‘s work to the plenary audience of all
participants.
c. Phase 3
1) On Friday afternoon, the USG seminar was led by a moderator through a WebIQ
facilitated plenary session in the DSC to develop the necessary game material for
analysis (key insights on international feedback to the US presentation, insight on
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international ways-ahead, Title X implications for maritime services
(USN/USMC/USCG), and recommendations for future areas of study and pathway
events).
2) On Friday afternoon, the NWC faculty and staff supporting the event seminars and
plenary sessions convened in plenary session to capture the impressions of the
moderators and facilitators of the event (key insights on international perspectives,
broad USG implications, Title X implications for maritime services
(USN/USMC/USCG), and recommendations for future areas of study and pathway
events). The faculty impressions were used in the analytical process to perhaps point
to an insight from a player or seminar that might otherwise be missed. NWC
impressions were not analyzed as a data stream from the event.
6. Game Considerations.
a. GMPG was fundamentally structured and designed to enable the US participants to listen
to and learn from the international participants.
b. International participants embodied a broad range of cultural and social norms and many
spoke English as a second language. In previous events, some international players have
shown deference to their American hosts when in Newport and let the host country (US)
‘take the lead’ in developing plans and stating opinions.
c. US participants, specifically USN/DOD, are seldom reserved and often attempt to take
the lead in games and events, a characteristic that may be accentuated by the ‘home turf’
of Newport.
d. All countries invited to ISS XIX were invited to GMPG and may choose to attend.
7. Game Assumptions.
a. The game was unclassified and executed as a self-contained event in McCarty-Little Hall,
US Naval War College, Newport, RI.
b. The GMPG was conducted in the English language.
8. Game Design Concept
a. Tasks that needed to be performed during the game to meet the game objectives:
1) Seminar-forming task must be immediately accomplished.
2) International seminars must surface and focus on key maritime issues to inform
creation of deliverable products.
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3) International seminars must present their work products to the assembled audience.
4) Individual player perspectives must be obtained to understand the full range of
viewpoints.
5) Group seminar products must be captured by the Control Cell.
6) USG seminar must be enabled to listen and understand international perspectives.
7) USG seminar must present their work product to the assembled audience.
8) USG seminar must determine the Title X implications for the maritime services of the
international way-ahead as developed by the participants.
9) Control Cell must determine themes, briefing seminars and moderator for each
plenary panel discussion.
b. Gaming procedures/mechanisms used to perform these tasks:
1) These tasks were accomplished through moderator lead seminar style discussions
drawing on individual player expertise.
2) Game products were in the form of plenary briefings using electronic, formatted
templates, electronic spreadsheet/database compilation of individual participant
surveys, WebIQ groupware, and paper format surveys/templates when necessary or as
required as a back-up format.
These were used to compile intermediate work
products and final presentations in such a way as to preserve the deliberate and linked
nature of issue (problem to solve) to mission (solve identified problems) to capability
(inherent to the solutions).
c. The specific steps required to outline the game’s structure:
1) This was a one-sided, moderator-led multi-seminar event. Participants consisted of
multi-national players from military and government organizations, primarily naval,
and US participants representing governmental departments and organizations that
are Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) stakeholders, optimally.
2) Participants in small-group seminars developed a collaborative response to the focus
issue presented to the group. Individual perspectives, dissenting opinions, and other
insights not captured through the seminar brief were captured through individual
surveys in the seminar cells.
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3) The Control Cell monitored the creation of all seminar products and determined
themes, panel moderators, and seminar cell panelists for each plenary panel
discussion.
4) Topical plenary panels focused on specific themes and led by a moderator presented
the work of each of the selected seminars in turn. Once all the panelists briefed the
work done by their seminar, the moderator asked questions to broaden or focus the
discussion and recognized participants from the audience to ask further questions or
provide additional comment on the chosen panel topic.
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Appendix H
Data Collection and Analysis
I.

Introduction

One of the most important functions of the U.S. Naval War College, War Gaming Department
(WGD) is to answer timely research questions posed by game sponsors. In order to do so,
capturing data that is germane to the sponsor‘s specific area of interest is critical, because
successful data capture enables useful analysis and ensures a symbiotic relationship between
game design and subsequent findings. In order to ensure that data collection methods and
analytic techniques are relevant to the game objectives for the 2010 Global Maritime
Partnerships Game (GMPG or Global ‗10), a Data Collection and Analysis Plan (DCAP) was
developed and is presented here as executed. The U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),
through his staff element OPNAV N2/N6, is the sponsor for this project.
It is important to note that the GMPG was a highly inductive, qualitative activity using mixed
methods (i.e., triangulationi) and employing decidedly phenomenological analytical techniques.
As a phenomenological research project, post-game analysis for GMPG sought to ―describe and
interpret the experience of people in order to understand the essence of the experience as
perceived by those studied‖ii. Specifically, phenomenological research focuses on participant
perspectives. These participant (i.e., game player) perspectives are garnered through ―extensive,
in-depth, unstructured interviews‖iii. Accordingly, the GMPG differs from other recent WGD
projects in that the analytic process employed herein relied far more on ethnographiciv (i.e.,
observed) data captured by ethnographers and technographers in the game seminar cells, as well
as self-declared player insights observed during game play, rather than analysis conducted by
subject matter experts after the game concluded. In essence, both U.S. and international
participants provided their own cell-based analysis of the national, regional and cross-regional
catalysts to instability, and the impediments to forming effective regional and cross-regional
partnerships within the maritime domain, as well as proposed solutions to mitigate those issues.
At the conclusion of the game, the Data Collection and Analysis Team (DCAT) applied a variety
of qualitative content and context tools and techniques to aggregate data and identify key themes
that may prove of interest to the sponsor for future research, policy making, and resourcing.
II.

Game Purpose

Today's world presents many opportunities and challenges for humankind. Globalization, manled change around the entire planet, has led to more robust access to raw materials, human
capital resources, the methods and means of production, and established and emerging markets.
However, a negative impact of globalization has been the relative advantage that empowered
nations, organizations and groups with means have employed to exploit the weaknesses in
governance (will, capabilities and capacities) where found globally; impacts acutely felt by
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disempowered nations. While maritime theft, piracy, illegal fishing, and pollution are examples
of overt exploitive acts occurring in the littorals, additional complex issues such as human
smuggling, illicit drug trafficking, and gun running are also connected to the seascape. In
addition to these direct, immediate human-interactive problems are long-term environmental
changes and episodic natural and man-caused disasters. Prolonged drought, tsunamis,
earthquakes, oil spills, and epidemics and pandemics on national, regional, and cross-regional
levels are examples of these types of problems.
Whether man-made, led, influenced or natural, these problems severely stress the social fabric of
human interaction and are catalysts to instability that must be mitigated or resolved. Navies,
Coast Guards, maritime organizations, and the broader community of stakeholders that interact
directly with the sea form the solutions to these catalysts in the maritime domain. The purpose
of the GMPG was to identify the catalysts to instability at the national, regional and crossregional levels as well as the impediments to forming effective regional and global partnerships
in the maritime domain from both U.S. and international perspectives. For the purposes of this
game, catalyst to instability is defined as anything that initiates, accelerates, or causes an event or
series of events to adversely impact the safety, security, economy, or environment of a nation,
region, or super-region.
Understanding these impediments is important to U.S. Navy Title X (organize, train, equip)
responsibilities because these catalysts to instability, including, but not limited to, resource
scarcity, epidemics and pandemics, and regional and transnational criminality, foster broad
challenges to U.S. national security policy. The U.S. Navy plays a critical role in confronting
such challenges through forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection and
humanitarian assistance and disaster response. However, as identified in the Global ‗08 Title X
game, such efforts cannot be sustained without effective international engagement and
cooperative partnerships in maritime security (i.e., Maritime Domain Awareness).
III.

Game Objectives

The Global Maritime Partnerships Game was designed to qualitatively and descriptivelyv
explore the following five specific objectives:
Identify national, regional and cross-regional catalysts to instability (e.g., resource
scarcity, epidemics and pandemics, and regional and transnational criminality) from both
international and U.S. perspectives
Discern what relationships, if any, exist between these catalysts and the maritime domain
Identify broad-based partnership requirements (e.g., policy, legal, technological, etc.)
that will enable Maritime Domain Awareness in order to counter catalysts to instability
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Provide an environment for participants to explore and appreciate the complexities of
establishing and maintaining effective maritime partnerships through domestic and
international perspectives
Provide participants with an opportunity to familiarize themselves with a sampling of
current technological research and innovations in Maritime Domain Awareness
This year‘s event built on the Global ‘08 and other NWC games, academic research, and the
International Seapower Symposium XIX hosted in October 2009 at the U.S. Naval War College
in Newport, Rhode Island.
By applying an inductivevi game design and corresponding phenomenological analytic
framework, the Naval War College War Gaming Department was able to the identify catalysts to
instability at the national, regional and cross-regional levels as well as the impediments to
forming effective regional and global partnerships in the maritime domain. This game also
employed data visualization in order to summarize and conceptualize those catalysts,
impediments and proposed solutions at the national, regional and cross-regional levels.
Research Questions
In order to address the mutually agreed upon objectives established by OPNAV N2/N6 and the
Naval War College, the following overarching research question was proffered in this game:
Based on the catalysts to instability derived from the international participants, what are
the impediments to forming effective regional and global partnerships in the maritime
domain?
At a more structured level, this game sought to inductively examine the following research
questions:
What do the international participants in this game consider to be the present-day
catalysts to instability in their respective region of the world?
What do the U.S. participants in this game consider to be the present-day catalysts to
instability?
What is the relationship of these regional catalysts to the maritime domain?
What do the international participants consider to be the present-day catalysts to
instability on a global scale?
What is the relationship of these international catalysts to the maritime domain?
Based on the regional catalysts to instability provided by the participants in this game,
what are the impediments to building effective regional maritime partnerships?
Based on the cross-regional catalysts to instability provided by the participants in this
game, what are the impediments to building effective cross-regional maritime partnerships?
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The independent variable in this game was the impediments to forming partnerships at the
regional and cross-regional levels, while the primary dependent variable was the cell‘s ability to
mitigate these catalysts based upon regional and cross-regional partnerships in the maritime
environment. In order to focus each cell at the high-operational-to-low-strategic level, specific
capabilities were aggregated to the greatest extent possible.
The GMPG strove to answer these questions through direct observation (i.e., ethnographic data
capture), facilitator-guided sessions within each of the seminar player cells and direct
observation of large group plenary sessions. Because these recorded observations, discussions,
and plenary sessions were ―scrutinized…in search of patterns that the data reflect,‖ the
overarching data collection process is inductivevii. Analysis of the overarching research question
is also considered descriptive because it ―revealed the nature of certain situations, settings,
processes, relationships… [and] systems…‖viii Importantly, there is no predictive value inherent
in this data, because this game, like most, lacks sufficient reliability and consistency as a
research instrument. Unlike experiments and other types of empirical social research, games are
rarely repeated to create a statistically valid sample using the same general population.ix
Accordingly, this game data is not inferential and findings cannot be generalized.x
IV.

Game Design as a Catalyst for Inductively-Generated Knowledgexi

This game was designed to enhance players‘ understanding of the catalysts to instability and the
impediments to fostering national, regional and cross-regional partnerships in the maritime
environment, as well as to inductively generate knowledge that can form the basis for future
deductive hypothesis testing. To foster a setting favorable to phenomenological research, a one
sided, seminar style game was developed in which up to 15 independent international player
cells and one U.S. government cell employed strategies focused on mitigating the greatest
regional and cross-regional catalysts to instability identified within individual game cells.
The international game seminar cells consisted of approximately 10-12 players per cell, ideally,
with one or two representatives from each regional nation that attended, based on the focus of the
cell. Each cell was staffed with a Naval War College facilitator, technographers, and
ethnographer (DCAP Section XI provides for a more complete description of each position‘s
responsibility). Two U.S. players took part in the international cells. A separate U.S.
Government cell was comprised of 34 players representing various entities including the Navy,
Department of Defense, Department of State, non-governmental organizations, and academic
institutions. This cell focused on addressing regional partnerships from a U.S. Navy/U.S.
Government-oriented perspective, while the international cells explored these same issues
through collective consensus built from the point of view of a cooperative regional or
international entity through the lenses of each stakeholder as represented in the process. The
international and U.S. cells strove to build partnerships to address complex problems. In order to
do so, all cells engaged in the following activities:
Define the catalyst to instability at the regional and super regional levels
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Identify the major impediments to forming partnerships at the regional and crossregional levels
Propose collaborative solutions to forming partnerships at the regional and crossregional levels
Identify existing partnerships at the regional and cross-regional level and ways to
improve the activities and actions employed by nations to address these issues
The week was divided into three broad phases. In the first phase the players focused on the
current state of the maritime environment, both issues and implemented solutions. In the second
phase players built from the current set of maritime partnerships, information sharing regimes
and MDA to develop better solutions to maritime problems and near-term recommendations for
solution implementation. Immediately following the conclusion of the game, players had the
opportunity in the third phase to attend an MDA technology symposium.
Phase 1 began on Sunday for the international players. Players were welcomed at a
luncheon and received overview briefings about the week ahead. Following the
briefings, players were grouped into their prospective game cells with moderators to
conduct initial introductions and complete initial individual baseline surveys.
Additionally, the moderator introduced the expected focus issue for initial cell work in
Phase 2 and determined if all players had an affinity for participation. Phase 1 continued
on Monday with regionally focused briefings on current implementations of maritime
partnerships, information sharing regimes and MDA presented by current regional
participants in those activities.
Phase 2 consisted of small cell seminar work by the player teams and large group plenary
panel presentations to present cell results to all participants. On Tuesday, Wednesday
and Thursday, seminars were led by an NWC moderator and assisted by an NWC
facilitator to produce briefing products using standardized templates for plenary panel
discussions. The plenary presentation product constituted the primary analytical output
for the cell. At the conclusion of the seminar session, players took individual web-based
surveys covering their seminar‘s work.
Phase 2 plenary panel discussions were included to enable broad sharing of the work
done in individual seminars. Game Control focused plenary panel sessions on specific
areas of interest from across the player cells. These sessions not only enabled broad
dissemination of the recommendations from the seminars, but also enabled constructive
criticism and inclusion of additional ideas from the broader audience. The Friday
morning plenary panel was attended by VADM Dorsett, USN, OPNAV N2/N6, and he
made concluding remarks at the end of the game to wrap-up the event and provide thanks
to the players for their work. Player out briefs are available in Appendix E.
Phase 3 introduced various MDA technologies to the participants on Friday afternoon. In
short, group presentations in the auditorium, presenters demonstrated their technology to
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participants. Additionally, some technology solutions were presented in smaller room
settings. The technologies presented and the detailed descriptions of the overall game
design are found in Appendix F and Appendix G.
The U.S. cell players, separate from all U.S. and international players in the international player
cells, broadly employed the technique of ‗active listening‘ to deeply understand the international
players and the perspectives they brought to the game. This understanding was developed
through Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the game. In support of the slightly different focus that the U.S.
cell had from the international cells, game activities were tailored for this cell:
Phase 1 began on Sunday for the U.S. cell players. Players were welcomed at a luncheon
and received overview briefings about the week ahead. Following the briefings, players
were grouped into their prospective game cells with moderators to conduct initial
introductions and complete initial individual baseline surveys. Additionally, the
moderator introduced the cell focus and processes for Phase 2. Phase 1 continued on
Monday with all players, from both U.S. and international cells, receiving regionally
focused briefings on current implementations of maritime partnerships, information
sharing regimes and MDA presented by current regional participants in those activities.
Phase 2 consisted of small cell seminar work by the player teams and large group plenary
panel presentations to present cell results to all participants. On Tuesday, Wednesday
and Thursday, the U.S. cell was divided into sub-groups for some of its work processes
based on player regional expertise. On Tuesday, led by NWC moderators and assisted by
facilitators, sub-groups evaluated the international cells‘ regional foci and considered the
expected themes, trends and issues that might emerge across the regions, as well as the
expected implications for the U.S. Government, broadly. At the conclusion of the
seminar session, players took individual web-based surveys covering their seminar‘s
work. During the Tuesday moderated plenary panel discussion, the U.S. Cell participated
as audience members only.
Phase 2 continued on Wednesday and Thursday for the U.S. cell. On both days, players
examined the products produced by the regional international cells, using their cultural
expertise and other expert knowledge. U.S. players ‗listened for meaning‘, actively
understanding, interpreting and evaluating what they had observed/reviewed.
Additionally, the U.S. cell produced a briefing on Thursday summarizing the perspectives
of the international seminars. During the Wednesday and Thursday moderated plenary
panel discussions, the U.S. cell participated as audience members only.
Phase 2 concluded on Friday morning with moderated plenary panel discussions. The
U.S. cell began the first Friday plenary session by briefing their understanding of the
perspectives and recommendations from the international player cells. Following the
U.S. cell presentation, each of the international cells presented their recommendations for
developing maritime partnerships, information sharing and MDA moving forward.
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Phase 3 for the U.S. cell was conducted on Friday afternoon. Using WebIQ groupware
software, NWC moderators led the U.S. participants through a session to consider the
broad implications of the proposed way ahead to the U.S. Government (broadly),
maritime services (USN/USMC/USCG specifically), and U.S. Navy (Title X
responsibilities to organize, train and equip). Upon the completion of the moderated
session, U.S. participants participated in the technology symposium.
During the analytical process, the DCAT conducted analysis of each game cell‘s output in series
from Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the game. By employing this serial approach as opposed to an
aggregated approach, analysts had the opportunity to explore the overarching research questions
with more consistency through triangulation of findings than if all the data was analyzed in
aggregate. Incorporating triangulation into the overall analytical approach yielded a more robust
final product than what would have resulted from a more rudimentary aggregated game.xii
DCAT members were assigned as required to best capture player input during the game. A
minimum of four ethnographers and three technographers were assigned to the U.S. cell during
the week. During the auditorium plenary sessions, ethnographers were assigned to capture
player comments and insights. For the U.S. Cell Friday afternoon session, one DCAT member
was posted at the front of the room to support the facilitator with a real time analysis feed from
the control room of the Decision Support Center, where additional DCAT members were
identifying common themes and providing a feedback channel to the moderator of content
provided into WebIQ.
V.

Cell Deliverables

For each game day, players in each of the international cells and the U.S cell developed the
following three core products:
Links & Nodes Chart. Captured via i2 Analyst Notebook software.
Microsoft PowerPoint slides (template provided) describing the catalysts to instability,
impediments and solutions. Although players will directly contribute to the final
template, its production will be facilitated by a technographer in each cell, thus allowing
the players to stay engaged in seminar discussion rather than stepping out-of-role to
complete a template. The U.S. cell will develop a separate template for each region and
one brief that will discuss the common themes that emerged amongst all regions.
Individual Player Surveys. All players assigned to the international cells and the U.S.
cell will complete these surveys three times (i.e., once after each cell seminar). Surveys
will include open-ended and fixed choice questions. See Appendix H, Annex 1 for
survey details.
VI.

Construct Validity for Survey Instruments
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Prior to game execution, each international and U.S. cell participant completed a background
survey comprised of questions designed to ―gather data about the subject‘s background and
experience.‖xiii This survey assisted the Control Cell in identification of the international
participant‘s regional and cross-regional catalysts to instability in order to assign them to their
respective regional, issue-based cells. This survey also afforded players the opportunity to
familiarize themselves with the survey web-based software application prior to conducting their
first seminar session the next day. Survey questions featured a variety of open-ended questions
(see Annex 1 to Appendix H for additional information):
GAME OVERVIEW:
Today‘s world presents many opportunities and challenges for humankind. Globalization has led to more
robust access to raw materials, human capital resources, and established and emerging markets. However,
this has also yielded unintended consequences by emphasizing inequities between nations in terms of
their assets and capabilities. Perhaps nowhere has this disparity been more profound than in the maritime
domain. While maritime theft, piracy, illegal fishing, and pollution are examples of overt acts occurring in
the littorals, broader, more complex issues such as human smuggling, illicit drug trafficking, and gun
running are also connected to the seascape. Such issues are not linked exclusively to the socioeconomic
impacts of globalization; but rather, are also associated with climate change and natural and human
caused disasters such as prolonged drought, tsunamis, earthquakes, oil spills, and epidemics and
pandemics on national, regional, and cross-regional levels.
The purpose of the 2010 Global Maritime Partnerships Game (GMPG) is to identify catalysts to
instability from national, regional and cross-regional perspectives in order to form effective regional and
global partnerships in the maritime domain.
Definition: Catalyst to Instability: Defined as anything that initiates, accelerates, or causes an event or
series of events to adversely impact the safety, security, economy, or environment of a nation, region, or
super-region. The following catalysts to instability were provided to the players.
1) State Actor
2) WMD Proliferation
3) Piracy
4) Environmental Group(s)
5) Environmental Crimes
6) Environmental Disasters
7) Narcotics Trafficking
8) Illegal Fishing
9) Terrorism
10) Weapons Trafficking
11) Port Vulnerability
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12) Oil Smuggling
13) Human Trafficking
14) Illegal Immigration
15) Competition for Natural Resources (e.g., Diamonds, etc)
16) Competition for Energy Resources (e.g., Oil, Gas, etc)
17) Territorial Dispute (e.g., EEZ, TTW and Borders)
18) Government Corruption
19) Threats to Critical Infrastructure
20) White Collar Crime (money Laundering, fraud, etc.)
21) Other: ________________________________
REGIONAL
1) For your specific geographic region, which of the threats listed below do you consider to be the
greatest catalyst to instability that has regional maritime security implications?
2) For the catalyst identified in Question #1, describe how it affects the maritime security environment for
your specific geographic region?

CROSS-REGIONAL
3) Thinking beyond your region, which of the threats listed below do you consider to be your greatest
catalyst to instability that has cross-regional maritime security implications?
4) For the catalyst identified in Question #3, describe how it affects the maritime security environment for
your specific geographic region?

Surveys will also be conducted in both the international cells and the U.S. cell at the conclusion
of each seminar within the game (i.e., three times over three days). Much of the emphasis of
these surveys will be placed upon gathering players‘ ―perceptions of the systems and processes
they are employing, their knowledge of and attitudes towards…subjects…perceptions and
insights…and their ideas about how…systems and work processes might be improvedxiv.‖ The
three surveys developed and administered to the players gather individual player perspectives on
impediments, regional, and cross-partnerships. These survey questions feature a variety of openended questions, including the following:
1) From the list below, please select the regional maritime issue discussed in your cell.
2) From the list below, please select the regional maritime issue or issues of concern

that should have received more attention.
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3) What other impediments at the regional level, should your cell have taken into

consideration, but were not adequately addressed?
4) What other solutions at the regional level should your cell have taken into consideration, but
were not adequately addressed?
5)

Identify other countries (that your group discounted or overlooked) in your region that you
would recommend partnering with to develop a collaborative solution? Please discuss the
reasons for these partnerships?

All of the questions included in the baseline and post-move surveys were pre-tested (along with
assessing overall instrument efficacy) during the Alpha and Beta tests with a ―small sample of
individuals from the population [being studied]…or one very similar to it.‖xv Great care was
placed to ensure survey questions did not presuppose a desired outcome on the part of the
researchers or ―skew the agenda…‖xvi Moreover, post-move survey questions focus on what
players will do in the game (and, more importantly, why), as opposed to relying heavily on their
past experiences for justification of their actions.xvii
VII.

Data Collection Protocol

The DCAP for the Global Maritime Partnerships 2010 game ensured six specific areas were
considered for post-game analysis. These are as follows:
Identify regional and cross-regional catalysts to instability (e.g., resource scarcity,
epidemics and pandemics, and regional and transnational criminality) that have maritime
security implications from both international and U.S. perspectives.
Based on the regional and cross-regional catalysts to instability provided by the
participants in this game, what are the impediments to building effective regional and
cross-regional maritime partnerships?
Based on the regional and cross-regional impediments provided by the participants in this
game, what are the international community‘s solutions to building effective regional and
cross-regional levels maritime partnerships?
Identify broad-based partnership requirements (e.g., policy, legal, technological, etc.) that
will enable Maritime Domain Awareness in order to counter the catalysts to instability
identified in each move during the game.
What regional and cross-regional partnerships currently exist that enable Maritime
Domain Awareness in order to counter catalysts to instability?
Based upon the international community‘s perceptions of the catalyst to instability and
regional partnerships, what are the implications to the United Sates government,
Department of Defense and U.S. Navy Title X?
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The DCAP identified thirteen data streams, twelve of which were collected during the game. All
DCAT members involved in these collection efforts received instruction in proper data capture
techniques during a pre-game bootstrap session, held on 03 October 2010 at 1100 hours.
The datasets that were analyzed in this game are considered descriptive because they ―reveal the
nature of certain situations, settings, processes, relationships…[and] systems…‖xviii Because they
are descriptive, the focus of the DCAT prior to compiling and writing the game report is to
aggregate and ―assess the data and clarify the information that has been gathered‖xix .
DCAT members are also responsible for ensuring quality assurance/quality control of the
datasets submitted by the international cells and the U.S. cell during game play. Specifically,
DCAT members ensured the following parameters were implemented for the nine data streams
that were used for post-game analysis, and development of the final game report:
Formatting and standardization: Move templates submitted to the Control cell must
adhere to the structure provided by the control team. Should any issues with any of
the player cell‘s inputs be identified during the game, the DCAT will immediately
report their concerns to the Control cell for possible corrective action. It is the
responsibility of the technographers in each cell to ensure that templates are properly
populated and saved.
Internal validity: Collection instruments must be designed correctly to ensure that
accurate conclusions can be drawn from the data. To ensure their proper use during
game play, specific internal validity issues with these instruments and the information
they are designed to collect were identified during the Alpha and Beta tests, and have
been corrected prior to the start of player move number one, which will occur in the
morning session on 03 October 2010.
External validity: Due to the inherent challenges posed by ensuring consistent,
accurate measurement in gamesxx, criterion validity is used to ―see if the results from
an item or set of measures (a scale) are similar to some external standards or
criteria.‖xxi External validity applies predominately to the survey questions that will
be asked in the individual international cells and U.S. cell player surveys that will be
captured. In order to ―provide…quality controls on data collection‖xxii these
questions were evaluated by an internal focus group as part of the Alpha and Beta
testing process, prior to being deployed in the game.
VIII. Analytic Methodology
Current thinking in the field of social research suggests that a variety of analytic tools should be
employed in behaviorally based activities such as war games, thus maximizing the credibility of
the workxxiii. One widely accepted methodology that takes advantage of multiple techniques is
―triangulation.xxiv This approach allows us to derive the same or very similar conclusions using
different datasets or methods.xxv Much of the strength of triangulation stems from its ability to
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―distinguish between the idiosyncratic…and the representative.‖xxvi This method also allows the
researcher to ―…base inquiry in the assumptions being used…[and] evaluat[e] questions…with
the appropriate methodology rather than the methodology driving the evaluation.‖xxvii Consistent
with this approach, the eight data streams collected during this game will incorporate a variety of
research procedures into analysis. A brief description of each analytic tool follows. This
information is also summarized in the table found on the next page. The overarching
triangulation approach is also depicted in the figure found in Section X of the DCAP.
Content Analysis: Described as ―a…method whereby a researcher seeks objectively to
describe the content of communication messages that people have previously
produced‖xxviii. ―Content analysis involves identifying coherent and important
examples…and patterns in the data… [and subdividing]…data into coherent categories,
patterns, and themes.‖xxix For the purposes of this game, content will be ―binned‖ to
determine which, if any, of the six focus areas presented in part VIII of this DCAP are
supported by player actions, comments, or White cell assessment.
Grounded Theory: A more detailed, methodologically sound approach to analysis than
the initial step of content analysis, grounded theory employs systematic, hierarchical
procedures to develop inductively derived theory grounded in data. Grounded theory
―directs researchers to look for patterns in data so that they can make general statements
about the phenomena they examined‖xxx. For the purposes of this game‘s analysis, the
DCAT will be using ―an inductive, theory discovery methodology that allows the
researcher to develop a theoretical account of the general features of a topic while
simultaneously grounding the account in empirical observations or data‖xxxi
Data Visualization: By comparing and contrasting the players‘ activities in the areas of
maritime security, stability operations, and building partnerships within the context of
capabilities, benefits, and intended consequences, overlapping Venn diagrams can be
produced that will allow the DCAT to identify gaps, seams, and overlaps in U.S. Navy
actions supporting other nations and organizations. xxxii

Dataset Namexxxiii

Inherent Value of Data

Primary Analytic
Technique

Pre-Game Player Survey

Background About Players

Content Analysis

Catalyst to Instability

Player Cell Assignments

Content Analysis

Cell Links & Nodes Chart using i2
Analyst Notebook

What Players did in Game

Content Analysis
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Cell Briefing Template via PowerPoint

What Players did in Game

Content Analysis

Environmental Notes during Cell
Discussions via Excel Spreadsheet

Why Players did in Game

Grounded Theory

Environmental Notes during Group
Plenary Discussions

Why Players did in Game

Grounded Theory

Post-Move Cell Player Surveys via InRelief

Why Players did in Game

Grounded Theory

White Cell Assessment/Environmental
Notes

What Players did in Game

Content Analysis

White Cell Subject Matter Expert
Insights

International Engagement
Policy Implications

Content Analysis

Environmental Notes during Final
Plenary Session

International Engagement
Policy Implications

Content Analysis

Player thoughts via WebIQ (U.S. Cell
Only)

Why Players did in Game

Content Analysis

Cell Final Session Outbrief (Player
derived)

What & Why Players did
Game/ Policy Implications

Content Analysis

Cell Links & Nodes Chart using i2 Text
Chart & Analyst‘s Notebook

International Engagement
Policy Implications

Data Visualization
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Content
Analysis

.

Grounded Theory

Data Visualization
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IX.

Data Collection and Analysis Team Roles

Members of the Data Collection and Analysis Team (DCAT) were assigned to specific roles
based upon their experience, education, and interests. The five specific functions assigned to the
DCAT are as follows:
DCAT Team Leader/Assistant Team Leader: Serves as Incident Commander and Assistant
Incident Commander, respectively and is responsible for all aspects of data management,
collection, analysis, and report writing. Any issues involving collection strategies, information
technology challenges, concerns with methodologies or analytic procedures, or DCAT personnel
should be brought to the attention of the Team Leader/Assistant Team Leader.
Collection Leader: Responsible for data management during the game as well as post-execution
organization of files. Questions regarding file structure, data import/export, and information
release should be referred to the Collection Leader.
Report Leader/Assistant Report Leader: Primary author for the Game Report, responsible for
organizing, writing, and editing much of its four primary areas (i.e., Introduction, Game Design
& Research Methodology, Analysis & Results, and Conclusions/Recommendations for Further
Study). Tasks other members of the DCAT with preparation of report sections and ensures
compliance with requisite deadlines.
Technographers(s)/Real-Time Analyst(s): Populates links and nodes charts based on participant
discussions and ensures that data are properly saved on the Unclassified GAMENET for
subsequent analysis. Performs on-going analysis through the course of game play including
review of incoming data streams for common themes and ideas, content analysis, grounded
theory, and data visualization. Reports emerging patterns throughout the course of game play to
DCAT Team Leader for use by Game Director, Designer, and Plenary Panel Moderators. At the
conclusion of the game, develops links and nodes charts, cell PowerPoint slides/Word
Documents, and serves as primary author(s) of the data visualization portion of the Game Report.
He supports the Ethnographer in collecting player comments through environmental recording.
Ethnographer (Environmental Recorder(s)): Employs a variety of ethnographic techniques to
capture player insights and White cell/subject matter expert ideas during the game play. He
records observations in Microsoft Word and Excel for use by Real-Time Analyst(s) both during
and after game play.
Additional information and training regarding specific DCAT members‘ roles was provided
during a ―bootstrap‖ session, held on 03 October 2010 at 1000 hours. A recall bill/manning
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spreadsheet was provided. The entire NWC WGD GMPG team participated in Control Cell
meetings daily during the game at the end of the player game day.
X.

Summary of Products, Draft Game Report Outline, and Schedule for Deliverables

In order to ensure that data are collected to support the stated objectives, specific products were
developed subsequent to game analysis, all of which are unclassified. These are as follows:
Global Maritime Partnerships 2010 Post-Game Game Executive Summary
Executive PowerPoint Brief
Game Report
Game Information Summary Sheet
The game report will be comprised of six major sections, plus a table of contents. The six main
sections are as follows:
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2. OVERVIEW
a. Overview
b. Background
c. Purpose of GMPG
d.

GMPG Objectives

e.

Research questions

3. GAME DESIGN
a. Game Design Introduction
b. Game Design
c. Analytical Framing
d.

Collection Approach

e. Identification of Independent and Dependent Variables
f.

Definition of Key Terms

4. ANALYSIS & RESULTS
a. Themes, Observations and Insights
b.

Title 10 Implications

c.

Limitations of Game Design and Analysis
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d. International Participant Demographics
e. U.S. Participant Demographics
5. WGD LESSONS LEARNED / RECOMMENDATIONS
a.

Administration and Logistics

b. Future Events
c. Future Game – U.S. Centric
d. Future Games – Regionally Centric
6. Appendices
a.

Attendees

b.

Background Maritime Security Games

c.

Research/ Associated Events

d.

Schedule of Events

e.

Cell Outbriefs

f.

Technology Symposium

g.

Game Mechanics

h.

Data Collection and Analysis Plan (DCAP)

i.

Regional Cell Analysis

j.

Administration / Logistics

k.

Glossary

Specific remaining benchmarks for the Data Collection and Analysis Team are follows:
 Alpha/Beta Tests for Global Maritime Partnerships 2010 Game……. ………23/24 Sep 2010
 Survey Pre-Test/Questions Focus Group……………..………………….........27/28 Sep 2010
 Data Collection Loop/Analytic Tools Test…………………….............................30 Sep 2010
 Global Maritime Partnerships Game Execution………..…….……………… 03/08 Oct 2010
 Analysis/Game Report Preparation…………...…………………….....……11Oct/1 Dec 2010
 Executive PowerPoint Brief Due……………..………….………………………..29 Oct 2010
 Final Game Report/Remaining Deliverables Due……………….………………. 17 Dec 2010
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determine to “verify the consistency of findings.” McMillan, J.H. & Wergin, J.F. (2010). Understanding and
Evaluating Educational Research (Fourth Edition). (p. 12) . Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson
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Ibid (p. 90).
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Berg, B.L., (2007). Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (Sixth Edition), pp. 172-174. Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.
v

Because this game is exploring phenomena, its emphasis is on the player experiences, which will be detailed at
length in predominately unstructured interviews and plenary sessions. Accordingly these data are descriptive
because they discuss what the players did during the game and why they said they made specific actions; however,
neither predictability nor inferentiality should be assumed.
vi

Induction strives to connect seemingly unrelated or disparate events using pattern analysis in order to form a
basis for developing hypotheses or conclusions (in Brightman, Today’s White Collar Crime (p. 354), Routledge,
2009).
vii
Leedy, P.D, & Ormrod, J.E. (2005). Practical Research: Planning and Design (Eighth Edition) (p. 96). Pearson.
viii
ibid (p. 134).
ix
Dunnigan, J.F. (2000) Wargames Handbook, Third Edition (p. 325).
x
The ability of research based on a sample to be generalized to an overall population (in Salkind, N.J., (2004).
Statistics for People Who Think They Hate Statistics (p. 104). Sage).
xi
See Patton, M.Q. (1997). Utilization-Focused Evaluation: The New Century Text (Third Edition), pp. 219-222. SAGE:
Thousand Oaks, CA.
xii

Dunnigan, J.F. (2000) Wargames Handbook, Third Edition (pp. 325-328) Writers Club Press.
Alberts, D.S. & Hayes, R.E. (Eds.) (2002). Code of Best Practice Experimentation. (p. 246). Command and Control
Research Program.
xiii

xiv

Ibid, pp. 246-247.

xv

Bachman, R. & Schutt, R.K. (2003). The Practice of Research In Criminology and Criminal Justice (Second Edition).
(p. 193). Sage.
xvi

Alberts, D.S. & Hayes, R.E. (Eds.) (2002). Code of Best Practice Experimentation. (p. 247). Command and Control
Research Program
xvii

Empirical research has clearly shown that decision-makers frequently err, through their failure to “use
established psychological theories and practices to guide them in their choices,” and “being overly reliant on their
personal experiences…” Goldstein, N.J., Martin, S.J. & Cialdini (2008). Yes! 50 Scientifically Proven Ways to Be
Persuasive. (pp. 4-5). Free Press.
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All of these datasets are considered qualitative and descriptive
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Appendix I – Regional Cell Analysis
1.1. Observations, Insights, & Player Recommendations
This section is an aggregated synopsis of all the cell products and individual player
surveys collected during the game. Specifically, cell presentations, link and node charts,
ethnography notes, and individual post-move survey results were aggregated, analyzed
and presented according to the geographic groupings and individual player and country
assertions made during the game. Each of the cells identified the following observations,
insights and recommendations to forming maritime partnerships in order to effectively
address the stressors and demands encountered in the maritime environment.
1.2. Discussion: The 83 players from 46 countries identified the following impediments and
proposed solutions in individual player surveys, discussions and game play.
Sub Region: Mediterranean Sea
Countries: France, Morocco, Lebanon, Israel, Italy, Spain, Turkey, Egypt
Catalyst to Instability: Drug trafficking, illegal immigration, critical infrastructure
protection, piracy, energy competition, resources and associated sea lanes, EEZ and
border issues, weapons trafficking and Illegal fishing
Observations
Players identified that in order to improve and build partnerships, a commonly
agreed upon definition and understanding of global maritime partnerships was
required. Players also agreed that Global Maritime Partnerships serves as a
collective effort among nations to reduce the realm of illegal activity and threats
at sea in support of national goals. Furthermore, an agreed upon end state will
allow nations to effectively generate a common approach.
Players agreed that the Mediterranean Sea was a relatively secure region with a
lack of perceived threat. Based on this lack of perceived threat, an increase in
level of effort yields insufficient return on investment. Players also noted that this
lack of perceived threat influences public perception and competing national
priorities.
Player identified a number of impediments to information sharing to include
security classification, cultural, legal, interagency, technological, and
coordination.
Insights
Players derived that the diversity of data classification levels by each country
poses a significant problem to sharing information regionally. Particularly, one
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player noted that an attempt to declassify information in order to maintain
confidentiality of sources will allow for an increase in information sharing and
build trust. The players attributed this assertion primarily to the diverse definitions
of information and intelligence and national strategies to achieving efficacy in
MDA.
Players cited that national authorities and major legal issues restricted countries
from sharing. Specifically the legal and diplomatic issues were due to significant
resistance from North African countries to initiate agreements with the European
Union.
Players derived that technical barriers to information sharing are the easiest to
address. Some players noted that a single national point such as the UK‘s NMIC
or Italy‘s SIEMS were ideal models for sharing information regionally.
Players briefly discussed a multilateral maritime partnership or coalition aimed at
promoting stability and prosperity throughout the region. One proposal was to
leverage the existing Union for the Mediterranean. However, players noted that
this partnership has yet to prosper due to a lack of leadership, robust threat and
coordination among neighboring countries.
Player Recommendations
Players noted that information sharing and partnership building would best be
achieved through a multi-layered regional approach through agreements, either
bilaterally or through coalitions.
Players suggested continuing the initiation and improvement of regional
partnerships through military engagement which could evolve into more robust
diplomatic relationships. Diplomatic relations were noted as an essential
component to enduring long term solutions in the region.
Players collectively postulated the need to continue efforts to federate regional
and trans-regional networks (i.e., VRMTC and TRMN).
The use of existing venues (RSS, VRMTC-TRMN Annual Meeting, 5 + 5
exercise, EU/Non-EU forums & CHEN) was noted as an essential next step to
advancing regional partnership efforts.
Players collectively agreed that regional standardization for classification levels
was an essential element of sharing information.
The establishment of partnerships both with Mediterranean countries not currently
involved, and other countries of interest was noted as an important next
implementation step.
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Sub Region: Pacific Ocean
Countries: Japan, Australia, Singapore, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia
Catalyst to Instability: Maritime Terrorism and Piracy threats to Sea Lines of
Communication
Observations
Players noted trust as an enduring problem within the Asia/Pacific region
requiring constant attention and management at the highest level of government.
Furthermore, it was highlighted that while most of the solutions are long term,
continuing naval engagement can mitigate certain short term impediments.
Many nations in the region have suspicions regarding certain initiatives and
motives for engagement and some of these initiatives are seen as an attempt at
external influence on domestic issues. Additionally, players noted that some view
MDA as a disguise to track vessels and people.
Territorial Sovereignty issues were recognized by the players as enduring
problems requiring constant attention and management. Players noted that
periodic disagreements and disputes among nations lead to breakdowns in
bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region.
Players noted various capacity and capability challenges as enduring issues that
requires constant changes in technology.
Players derived that there were many impediments encountered to sharing data,
unclassified and classified, at the sub-regional, regional and cross-regional levels.
Insights
Players derived that territorial disputes are a major issue in the region. This was
discussed mainly because there is not a universal ratification of UNCLOS
combined with the fact that portions of it (UNCLOS) are outdated. This is
holding back countries from fully integrating into partnerships and information
sharing arrangements. Additionally, a poor understanding of UNCLOS and
different interpretations on jurisdiction leads to questions of responsibility and
authorities. Specifically, some players noted concern over China‘s influence in the
region, while others noted they would adopt a ―standby‖ position until they get a
better feel for their role in the region. A few disputed territories noted by the
players include: Korean Peninsula (DPRK vs. ROK), Dokdo Island (ROK vs.
Japan), South China Sea & Spratly Islands (PRC, Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam,
Malaysia, etc.), East China Sea & Senkaku Islands (PRC vs. Japan), Indonesia
archipelagic sea lanes passage, Northern Territories Dispute (Japan vs. Russia)
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While there are a number of information sharing structures in place in the Asia
Pacific region, there remains room for other initiatives to supplement and
augment, specifically in South China Sea and South Pacific. The South Pacific
was described as ―a Black hole, unmonitored and ripe for exploitation by folks
with nefarious intentions.‖
Players cited that the Asia/Pacific region as a large geographic region with a great
degree of variability in capabilities and capacities of nations located within the
region. This lack of capacity and capability in some sub-regions leads to
challenges in developing partnerships and information sharing relationships.
These capacity shortfalls include: Coastal surveillance capabilities, information
fusion software, radar, C4I, thermal sensing, ships and aircraft, training and AIS
receiving sites.
Sharing of information across classified and unclassified domains and between
military, interagency, commercial entities remains a problem within the Asia
Pacific region because of a variety of reasons including trust and confidence,
territorial sovereignty, and capacity and capability.
Specific MDA-like
impediments include: national/policy/legal restrictions, technical/equipment
compatibility, commercial/economic sensitivities, and privacy restrictions.
Player Recommendations
Players suggested that in order to increase transparency and foster greater trust in
the region, there should be an increase in personnel/ LNO exchange programs and
sharing of doctrinal publications, best practices, and other maritime security
documentation.
Players recommended that the U.S. should continue 1206 program. Specifically,
the U.S. Navy should continue capacity building and funding to Philippines,
Indonesia, and Thailand (support via bandwidth, strategic lift, and
specialist/subject matter experts).
Regional leaders and U.S. should work with the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) to resolve territorial disputes. U.S. presence in region was
highly desired by the players. Specifically, players noted that consistent U.S.
presence in the region helps ―guarantee‖ freedom of navigation.
U.S. and other regional leaders work with commercial organizations to ensure
they understand the relevance of sharing and what incentives are available.
U.S. and regional leaders should work with the IMO to standardize data and
equipment protocols as well as encourage wider integration of International
Shipping and Port Security (ISPS) requirements for international maritime
commerce.
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Players suggested the development of an apparatus by USN and other regional
leaders to synergize MDA & partnership efforts to coordinate, reduce duplication,
and maximize benefit of resources allocated at the regional and cross-regional
levels.
Build upon the model of IFC (Information Fusion Center) by creating an open
space where everyone is included in participation and encourage the participation
of more countries. Players suggested leveraging or building upon existing models
(ReCAAP, IFC, PRC, and ISPS), specifically in the South China Sea and the
South Pacific.
Regional leaders and U.S should demonstrate the mutual benefit of MDA by
employing tailored sub-regional focused conferences, workshops and seminars.
Sub Region: Indian Ocean
Countries: India, Kenya, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania
Catalyst to Instability: Piracy
Observations
Although geographically grouped around the Indian Ocean, cell members
identified three sub-regions with unique issues: India and Pakistan – regional
maritime security is overshadowed by strategic concerns; Oman and Saudi Arabia
- Unable to secure their own maritime borders but satisfied with the status quo
and strongly prefer to work through Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); Kenya and
Tanzania – Resource-poor and open to any types of assistance and/or partnership
to increase capacity
Players cited the following themes as reasons that inhibit partnerships within the
region: political will, lack of trust, competing national interest, lack of capacity
and capability, unequal treatment of multinational partners, language and cultural
barriers, and technology incompatibilities.
Insights
Players suggested that the lack of trust in the region stems from unresolved bilateral issues, negative or lack of any historical relationships, external intervention
in internal affairs, hidden agendas, perceptional differences, and differing levels
of commitment to the issue, lack of transparency, limited engagement
opportunities, differing naval competencies, and double standards.
Players derived that lack of political will is often due to lack of interest,
commitment and competing interests, which in turn results in ―half measures,
mixed messages, and intermittent commitment of resources.‖
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Players postulated that enduring partnerships in the region should be of common
interest, equal, and voluntary in nature. While no ―one size fits all solution‖ exists
in this region, players were largely influenced by cell members‘ failure to
perceive a community of interest between their nations. Although geographically
grouped around the Indian Ocean, cell members did not view their respective
nations as regional partners and seemed less willing to enhance partnerships due
to a lack of common interest or shared threat.
Players discussed intelligence sharing in the region as being primarily bilateral in
nature; multilateral or unilateral sharing appeared somewhat problematic.
Moreover, limitations to intelligence sharing stemmed from technology,
classification, and fusion and analysis, as well as trust issues.
Due to the composition of this cell, it seemed that there were difficulties in
identifying a common maritime security issue that unites these disparate nations.
Kenya and Tanzania perceived piracy as a regional issue that has severely
impacted their economies due to the reluctance of merchant ships to enter their
waters. Other countries in the cell viewed piracy as a global issue, much like
climate change or illegal fishing.
Player Recommendations
Players preferred to leverage existing organizations such as the Indian Ocean
Naval Symposium, Gulf Cooperation Council, United Nations, and African Union
to enhance regional partnerships.
Players suggested the need to increase bilateral relations among nations and
improve sharing between existing organizations (e.g., GCC, UN, AU, etc.) and
maritime coalitions and commercial entities.
Promote maritime partnerships by improving regional relationships through
strengthening regional forums, promoting information sharing, and building
coalitions to tackle regional issues.
Players recommended that regional countries develop international protocols and
agreements.
Aligning domestic legislation through ratification of international regulation was
noted by the players as a necessary step to improving maritime security
cooperation.
Enhance regional capability and capacity building by increasing the frequency of
intraregional exercises with a focus on enhancing interoperability, encouraging
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technology sharing within the region, and strengthening regional institutions to
enhance training opportunities.
Sub Region: Baltic Sea
Countries: Sweden, Poland, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom
Catalyst to Instability: Lack of Understanding/Geopolitical Balance of Power
Observations
Throughout game play, players asserted that information and intelligence were
not adequately shared nationally, regionally, or cross-regionally due to various
impediments including over-classification of information, cultural differences and
legal challenges.
Players derived that there was an incomplete understanding of how other
countries and organizations both operate and approach maritime issues. This was
noted as ―one of the major challenges faced in the region‖.
Players indicated significant improvements made in the region to enhance
partnerships and Maritime Security Awareness. However, players also identified
the lack of a common legal interpretation and policy for conducting maritime
security operations in the region.
Insights
Players collaboratively cited that the region could improve upon information
sharing by leveraging existing MDA/MSA systems. The production of new
systems and technology investments should be a low priority over nontechnological aspects of partnerships. Specifically, players agreed that it was
essential to enhance funding in ―training, coalition conferences, seminars, and
travel.‖
Players conceded that maritime situational awareness was limited by the nonparticipation of Russia in the international information sharing systems
(SUCBAS, MARSUNO). SUCBAS was identified as a promising way forward
for further regional integration due to user controls of inputs. While most states in
the region regard SUCBAS as a MDA tool, the Swedes, in no uncertain terms, use
it to contribute to national maritime defense. Players also noted that understanding
the policies of Russia, China and North Korea regarding piracy, smuggling, and
MDA was essential in striving towards a commonly understood global maritime
picture.
The proposed global MDA solution was a combination of present regional
MDA/MSA networks; moreover, leveraging existing systems is likely to be
―easier, cheaper, and would garner greater acceptance among participants.‖
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It was identified by the cell that there were no common regional policy
interpretations (including legal aspects) for conducting maritime security
operations. Specific aspects noted by the players included: ―Liabilities,
Jurisdiction, and Prosecution‖, standards of evidence, standards of consequence
(e.g., no standard for what to do with pirates apprehended at sea) and
repercussions of environmental disasters which cross international maritime
boundaries.
Player Recommendations
Developing an information sharing policy for the Baltic region with tangible
output for ISS XX (October 2011) was touted as one of the most actionable and
short term recommendations made by the players.
The establishment of an unclassified information sharing system and portal for the
Baltic region was noted as an essential ―next implementation step‖ in working
towards better information sharing in the region.
In an effort to better understand the intentions and capabilities of both countries
and organizations, players discussed the desire to expand ISS XX invitations to
other countries, trade corporations, port authorities & international organizations.
With respect to specific partnership aspects between the U.S. Navy and regional
navies and coast guards, participating countries recommended to continue and
enhance confined shallow-water exercises (e.g., BALTOPS & NORTHERN
COAST).
Players derived that the international community should increase their
involvement in NATO Center‘s of Excellence (COE‘s) in support of regional and
cross-regional partnership building.
Collectively, players touted the continuing development of common international
legal standards, policies and procedures for information sharing, particularly the
interactions between regional MDA systems (e.g., VRMTC, SUCBAS, MSSIS,
OASIS).
Use existing national, regional and cross-regional models to develop international
best practices and ―courses of instruction‖ for inter-agency cooperation and
information sharing (e.g., NMIC, SUCBAS, VRMTC, and TRMN).
Sub Region: Black Sea
Countries: France, Morocco, Greece, Lebanon, Israel, Italy, Spain, Georgia, Bulgaria,
Turkey, Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine
Catalyst to Instability: Illegal Activities related to Terrorism
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Observations
The cell identified areas of improvement among interagency and international
partners particularly in the area of information and intelligence sharing. Players
noted that competing interpretations of intelligence classification levels presented
significant challenges to sharing unclassified data.
Players derived that trust factors among interagency organizations, specifically
within each of their countries represented during the game, were a common
obstacle. Other restriction such as national polices, classification, cultural and
technologies were identified as common impediments to sharing unclassified and
classified data both nationally and internationally.
Players agreed that in order to contribute the full spectrum of data to a global
MDA network, a common international framework or standard for information
sharing is needed. One player noted that ―it is difficult to combine information
sharing networks built to different standards without a commonly agreed upon set
of technology standard(s).‖
Insights
Most players during game play expressed the willingness and ability to share
unclassified, AIS-like information with international partners. However, the cell
collectively identified the need to establish a common regional strategy or
approach to sharing all types of data, particularly more sensitive operational data.
It was evident that players‘ definition of information and intelligence and the
sensitivities associated with each were drastically different, causing difficulties
within the cell to focus the issue down to a common root cause.
Interagency issues were noted by the cell as one of the major impediments to
sharing data both internally and externally. Specifically, players identified the
need for a ―common global maritime picture through identical software that can
link the Black Sea to the Mediterranean regions.‖ Specifically, one player noted,
―many countries in the region are willing to share, but lack the requisite
capabilities; and many of these countries still need to establish links to the U.S.
CNO to request assets and support.‖
Players acknowledged the need to expand Black Sea cooperation to other
countries in the region. Specifically, players noted Azerbaijan as a country with
which they would like to establish and enhance a maritime partnership. Several
players identified the existence of regional centers within their own respective
nations and around the world that were presently willing to accept other countries.
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Player Recommendations
Utilize the IMO to develop common information sharing framework, standards
and procedures for black sea region. Specifically, players offered the
establishment of a regional initiative, with the support of the IMO, aimed at
developing common classification standards.
Establish regional information sharing exercises among nations in either the
Black Sea Region or between the Black Sea and Mediterranean regions.
Players postulated that the GCC should expand information sharing links to
VRMTC as well as establish specific links with the respective participating
nations involved.
An increase in training, education and personnel in support of GCC coordination
centers was noted as an essential solution to advancing partnership efforts in the
region.
Collectively, players specifically noted that Azerbaijan should establish
information sharing links to other countries in the Black Sea within the
framework of the Black Sea Economic Forum.
Utilize existing regional operation and coordination centers and organizations to
advance regional MDA initiatives (e.g., VRMTC, GCC, etc).
Sub Region: Central & Western Africa
Countries: Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Cameroon and Gabon
Catalyst to Instability: Illegal Fisheries
Observations
The overarching theme identified by each of the sub-regional African cells
centered on a significant lack of general resources (e.g., operational assets,
dedicated funding, and economic activity) within each of their respective
countries.
Players derived that at the national, sub-regional and regional levels, ―Seablindness‖ as defined by the players, was a considerable impediment to
addressing the many demands and stressors encountered in the maritime
environment. This sub theme discussed was touted as a major contributing factor
and root cause to the general lack of resources.
Players generally agreed to the major demands and stressors encountered in the
maritime environment at the sub-regional and regional levels. However,
prioritization of these issues differed among many of the countries in attendance,
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mainly due to the game grouping of players within a seminar cell, which was
developed primarily from a U.S. perspective.
Regional communication and coordination between sub-regional organizations
(ECCAS and ECOWAS) were highly desired and discussed as essential next steps
to establishing situational awareness in the region. Communication and
coordination through development of regional protocols, policies and procedures
for information sharing and maritime security operations.
Insights
Players cited ―a lack of dedicated funding‖ at the national, sub-regional and
regional levels, in support of the various operational assets needed to effectively
detect, deter and defeat the maritime security issues of concern. The specific
inadequate platforms and logistics discussed by the players include a Coastal
Monitoring System along the Gulf of Guinea, patrol vessels, helicopters, and
MDA systems at the national, sub-regional and regional levels, as well as spare
parts, maintenance facilities and fuel.
In general, ―Sea blindness‖ was discussed as a major impediment to enhancing
maritime security partnerships. As defined by these players, ―Sea blindness‖ is a
lack of political focus and public awareness on maritime security and subsequent
investment. There was a consensus among the players that the collective lack of
recognition of maritime issues in the region is mainly due to ―political
leadership‘s focus on land-based issues.‖ One player noted, ―Political leadership
has no appreciation for the consequences (of) neglecting the maritime domain‖.
While players generally agreed to the variety of maritime issues encountered in
the region, there were competing national prioritizations. However, illegal
migration to other African sub-regions and Europe was noted as a major security
problem due to ―the unsafe methods used and criminal elements that were
involved in the business.‖ While the players did not identify their cell as an
official sub-region, mainly due to its composition, player cohesiveness and
willingness to work together was noted by the majority as a significant milestone
in achieving peace and prosperity through the region.
The need to enhance effective communication between West Africa (ECOWAS)
and East Africa (ECCAS) was noted throughout game play as an underlying
requirement to enhancing partnerships in the region. Specifically, players
leveraged the use of existing sub-regional organizations (e.g., ECCAS,
ECOWAS), coupled with the development of a ―higher level mechanism‖ (e.g.,
an operations center), to harmonize sub regional efforts. These organizations
coupled with the African Union were cited by the players as having the power and
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authority to enhance MDA and broader maritime partnerships; ―but they do not
have the will or awareness to take the next steps.‖
In order to effectively form partnerships at the sub-regional and regional levels,
players overwhelming desired ―common procedures (doctrine, communications,
ROE), common legal penalties for criminal activity; and needed persistent
surveillance capability for basic situational awareness, and sufficient economic
incentives for population to deter maritime crime (and creating) an alternative
means of survival.‖
Player Recommendations
Players derived that for the development of a Coastal Monitoring System along
the Gulf of Guinea, training was needed, along with subsequent policies.
International support was highly desired to facilitate the development of this
initiative.
Create an overarching regional operations center over the ECOWAS & ECCAS
operations centers and conduct regular exercises between these centers. Develop a
grass-roots awareness campaign to educate political leadership on maritime
security threats.
Develop a multilateral governing body or coalition focused on Maritime Security
(cross-functional members, funding controls, policy setting, etc).
Develop a common regional information sharing methodology.
Invest in regional repair facilities/personnel/equipment, training and purchase
operational platforms (to combat maritime pollution).
Sub Region: Central & South America
Countries: Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Panama, Guatemala,
Colombia
Catalyst to Instability: Drug Trafficking and Corruption
Observations
Drug trafficking was identified as the major catalyst to instability or maritime
security issue of concern within the Central and South American regional player
cells. The lack of a unified regional strategy to detect, deter, disrupt, and
prosecute narcotics traffickers in the maritime environment was viewed by all
participants as an overarching theme throughout the game.
Generally, the common impediments identified across these cells included trust
issues, classification standardization, technical incompatibilities, government
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corruption, and inadequate resources, funds and assets at the national, subregional and regional levels.
Players concluded a common disconnect exists between political and military
leadership, specifically within the context of competing national security
strategies, defense funding, and prioritization and allocation of defense resources.
Insights
Players derived that a more holistic approach should be taken in exploring drug
trafficking, particularly the ―spill-over‖ or regional implications exacerbated by
this phenomenon.
Specifically, players drew correlations between drug
trafficking and weapons trafficking, money laundering, and government
corruption.
Trust was viewed by the players as a long-term systemic barrier to cooperation
both within and outside their respective countries. However, international naval
cooperation at the unit and individual member level (e.g., liaisons) was identified
as a significant ―foot in the door‖ and way to enhance or initiate partnerships
across all levels of government. Long-term investment in cooperative events (e.g.,
conferences, exercises, games, etc) at the sub-regional and regional levels was
deemed as a highly effective and desired way of enhancing trust and partnerships
over time.
Players identified technical compatibility gaps among interagency and
international partners related to diverse technical and classification standards and
competing maritime operating pictures. Technology integration solutions
(feasibility studies, coordination groups, international support) were viewed as
primary sources for future interoperability at the national and regional levels.
Government corruption (e.g., political leadership, law enforcement, etc.) was
identified by the players as a root cause for the significant levels of drug
trafficking in the region. Moreover, players concluded a strong disparity between
political and military desired end state and competing national security strategies.
Specifically, there was a theoretical and practical divergence in addressing drug
trafficking as a land vs. maritime issue of concern. Most notably, a majority of the
players recognized the strong correlation between drug trafficking and corruption,
submitting that ―it‘s much more effective to interdict narco-traffickers at sea, than
it is to cut it off at its root cause.‖ Conversely, ―because corruption is influential
within higher levels of political leadership, it‘s often difficult to obtain the assets,
resources and funding needed.‖
Players concluded that while the number of bi-lateral partnerships in the region is
viewed as somewhat sufficient, an increased multilateral approach leveraging
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existing cooperative models (e.g., JIATF-South, UNASUL, etc.) is needed.
Specifically, players noted that JIATF-South serves as an effective and central
mechanism for sharing information regionally. However, several players noted
improvements are needed in the timeliness of actionable data dissemination and
that they desire to adopt a common operating picture rather than using a chat
function to identify specific operational positional data.
Player Recommendations
It was highly welcomed and desired by 90% of the Central/South American
participants of the participants that the International Chiefs of Navies within the
Central and South American regions should propose the development of a
regional information sharing strategy aimed at establishing common data and
technical protocols, standards, procedures. Several players noted the use of
existing international organizations (e.g., ROCRAM, IMO, and the InterAmerican Naval Conference) as a means to advance this initiative. Moreover,
several players noted the integration of national counter narcotics strategies and
applicable laws into a commonly defined and agreed upon regional strategy
would allow for shared responsibility and governance.
Cell members collectively encouraged CFAC to request section1206 funds from
SOUTHCOM to establish a regional maritime operations center that can serve as
a training and maintenance facility and logistical hub in support of counter
narcotics operations.
A regional effort aimed at integrating sub-regional efforts and best practices was
highly desired by the players. Players discussed this effort within the context of
leveraging existing conferences, exercises and games as a means to effectively
coordinate MDA and maritime security efforts.
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Appendix J
Administration / Logistics
Background. Lessons learned follow below for the conduct of the Administration and Logistics
portion of the game. The team was made up of numerous personnel from various NWC offices,
instrumental in ensuring the foreign participants were properly hosted:
NWC Events: handled all coordination for billeting and also liaised with the
NEX/Commissary and the base MWR department to ensure foreign officers had full
access to all amenities while staying aboard NS Newport.
NWC Travel Office: handled all travel reservations and orders for foreign participants
who hailed from countries that were officially funded by the US Navy to attend the game.
NWC War Gaming Department Comptroller: assisted by providing funding advice not
only for foreign travel arrangements, but also hosting events (Officers Club, Viking Bus
for transportation, etc.).
Lessons learned listed here are broken down into two groups: Internal to NWC and/or the War
Gaming Department and external to the same.
Internal Lessons Learned:
1. The timing of the game during the FY changeover created numerous issues both
internally and externally. Reserve manning support played a huge role in the success of
the logistical support of the game. As it was, orders were slow to be issued due to the
changeover and therefore quite a few Reservists cancelled their plans to drill with the
NWC for the game due to a lack of timely issued orders. This in turn led to the WGD
planners having to scramble in the last few days leading up to the game IOT secure
enough drivers to cover the airport/train station requirements without sacrificing safety
(for abnormally long driving shifts). Had the game been scheduled two weeks earlier or
later, more ―solid‖ funding and orders for Reservists could have been identified. Worst
case, the need for supplemental help could have been dealt with much sooner and
therefore would not have been an eleventh-hour call for assistance.
2. For an event this big, a full-time ―Game Knowledge Management Officer (GKMO)‖
should be assigned to attend to the registration website. Relative to the GMP website
management, normal primary duties for the NWC IT personnel detracted from being able
to effectively keep the website up to date and easy to use.
a. Additionally, the log-in view for the website needs to be more clear and concise.
Finding information should be a one or two step process – a prospective attendee
should not have to dig down three to five web pages to find information germane
to his/her attendance.
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b. Game Net accounts were not set up and ready for users at the beginning of the
game. If assigned, the GKMO should be able to easily coordinate this in advance.
3. The lead for the reservists‘ transportation team needs to be an officer at the paygrade of
O-4 or at least a very senior and experienced O-3. Originally, an O-4 was identified, but
when orders could not be secured in a timely manner this LCDR was unable to commit to
supporting the game. There were times when the assigned LTJG was overwhelmed with
requests from very senior officers from the participating countries and one of the WGD
O-5s had to step in and speak for him. Additionally, this LTJG‘s maturity and follow-up
skills were at times lacking. Though not a guarantee with a more senior officer assigned,
a game of this magnitude needs constant focus and attention to detail.
4. Logistics/Admin was not able to fully support eight early-arrival personnel on Friday (i.e.
hosting and shuttles into downtown Newport). While Visitor Handbooks with dining
information and ―Cab Cards‖ with taxi phone numbers were handed out to arrivals on
Friday night, dedicated van runs did not pick up until Sunday. Those who arrived on
Saturday did not require full transportation support until Sunday (most participants chose
to retire to their quarters after a full day of travelling). The Logistics team was able to
assign a van to make some limited runs during a lull in airport shuttling during the early
part of Saturday‘s schedule IOT secure dining options for some of the attendees that
specifically requested it. More specific direction should be provided to early arrivals in
future games.
5. Check-in procedures were complicated by the billeting of personnel at both the Navy
Chalet and the CBQ requiring drivers to drop off personnel at two different locations and
then bringing the CBQ billeted personnel back across the bridge to their respective
buildings. If at all possible, raise the possibility of registering all personnel on Coasters
Harbor Island to eliminate the need to shuttle back and forth across the bridge to and
from BLDG 1312 (CBQ Front Desk).
6. One source of information and point of contact for all hosting issues is absolutely
necessary. Many times misinformation was passed by other offices outside the NWC.
Sponsors and other stakeholders should be fully aware of the capabilities and limitations
of the NWC WGD staff in order to prevent duplication of efforts to maximum extent
possible.
7. ―End of the Week‖ hosting feedback forms, which have been used in the past, were
erroneously omitted from this game. This would have allowed a more thorough review
of lessons learned and enabled a more easily referenced set of notes to look back on.
8. Food delivery through the 1st deck loading dock (north/rear side) of MLH was easily
accomplished throughout the week. Additionally, food was staged in the back
passageway of the 2nd deck near the Game Tech offices (vice the patios adjacent to the
Café) in order to replenish the serving lines quickly. This minimized the impact of
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moving food carts and associated equipment through the halls and distracting the seminar
cells during the game day.
External Lessons Learned:
1. The number one outside issue experienced by the staff for this game was the lack of clear
situational awareness on who was actually attending. Bottom line up front – the NWC
WGD can easily send invitations and thoroughly tracking them.
a. Positive confirmation (much like ―read receipts‖ with emails) would have been
extremely valuable in helping to focus the attention of the OPNAV N52 desk
officers and the various Embassy Naval Attaches on those countries most eagerly
desired to participate in the game. These factors also served to take the teams‘
focus off the final planning of details that normally would have been addressed
during the final days leading up to the game. Proper placement of countries into
appropriate game cells was not accomplished until two days prior to the game due
to many ―pending‖ participants. Other issues included final headcounts in order
to release overbooked rooms back to the Navy Chalet/CBQ and even the internal
issue concerning early arrivals hosting mentioned above.
b. Invitations should be tracked and attacked in a 3-prong approach: First,
engagement of the OPNAV N52 Desk Officers when the invitations are first
delivered; Second, contact with specific country U.S. naval attaches; and Third,
as a last measure, the foreign country attaches assigned to embassies in
Washington, D.C. Reliance upon the OPNAV N52 desk officers (combined with
weak follow-up procedures) proved to be an almost single point of catastrophic
failure in obtaining attendance to this game.
c. In order to achieve critical game requirement of obtaining the most
knowledgeable, expert players, , invitations should be sent to be received a
minimum of 120 days prior to game start. This would help minimize the effects
of summer vacation and other various ―out of office‖ responses and therefore give
sufficient time to track desired attendance (provided positive feedback of
invitation requests is initiated and pursued from the time the invites are sent out).
For major international engagement efforts such as this game, an even earlier
game announcement and invitation are beneficial. Other countries operate on
different fiscal and operational cycles than the United States; identifying an
opportunity for participation a year or more in advance can enable a partner
nation to optimally plan for and facilitate event attendance: the right person,
funded by his government in the most cost-effective manner.
2. The specific ―funded‖ countries needed to be more apparent to the NWC team. The list
of "funded countries" provided at the Final Planning Conference proved to be largely
inaccurate and not subsequently adequately or clearly updated, which ultimately led to
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several instances of unnecessary funding decisions due to inadequate communications.
This presented confusion (about which participants were and were not partially or fully
funded) throughout the ticketing and the subsequent travel periods for participants, and
particularly for the CBQ/Newport Chalet bills. An accurate list was provided toward the
end of the game execution week that was extremely helpful when participants began to
check out of CBQ/Newport Chalet accommodations. It is understood that as OPNAV
N2/N6—N3/N5 (N52) determined that all the funds allotted towards certain country
attendance were not going to be utilized, these funds were offered and thus they went to
countries that either had initially declined or had not made a solid decision to attend, in
an effort to increase attendance at the game. This process of reallocation of funding
underscores the necessity of a very early invitation process with aggressive follow-up.
3. In addition to (1) and (2) above, recommend that future games requesting a large number
of international participants obtain from OPNAV N2/N6—N3/N5 (N52), or other
sponsor as appropriate, a desired attendance list by country, organization or individual as
appropriate.
This list, amplified by the reasons for the priorities and the decision
process for additional invitations well enable the Naval War College, OPNAV Country
Officers, Combatant Commander or their Naval Component Commander Staffs, U.S.
Embassy Naval Attaches, and other invitation conduit organizations, such as U.S.
Government Departments, appraised on the status and process of inviting participants.
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Appendix K
Glossary
Term
AIS
Analysis

Definition
Automatic Identification System
The abstract separation of a whole into its constituent parts in order to
study the parts and their relations

Analytic Framing
AU
CAMTES
Catalyst to Instability

A detailed sketch or outline of some social phenomenon
African Union
Computer Assisted Maritime Threat Evaluation System
Anything that initiates, accelerates, or causes an event or series of events
to adversely impact the safety, security, economy, or environment of a
nation, region, or super-region.

CCDR
Content Analysis

Combatant Commander
A method whereby a researcher seeks objectively to describe the content
of communication messages that people have previously produced

Cross-regional
CS-21

Relating to issues that go beyond a specific geographic area

C-SIGMA
Data Visualization

DCAP
DCAT
Deductive

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
Collaboration in Space for International Global Maritime Awareness
By comparing and contrasting the players‘ activities provides the ability
to identify gaps, seams, and overlaps in U.S. Navy actions supporting
other nations and organizations. Data Visualization: the process of
representing abstract business or scientific data as images that can aid in
understanding the meaning of the data. – or -- Data visualization is a
general term used to describe any technology that lets corporate
executives and other end users ―see‖ data in order to help them better
understand the information and put it in (a business) context.
Data Collection and Analysis Plan
Data Collection and Analysis Team
That which is deduced or drawn from premises by a process of reasoning;
an inference; a conclusion

Dependent Variable

A variable in a logical or mathematical expression whose value depends
on the independent variable

ECCAS
ECOWAS

Economic Union of Central African States
Economic Community of Western African States
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Ethnographic

Data collection that is done through participant observation, interviews,
questionnaires, etc.

EU
Game Sponsor
GCC
GMPG
Grounded Theory

European Union
Organization providing the objective and funding for the game

Idiosyncratic
IFC
IMO
Impediment

An individualizing quality or characteristic of a person or group
Information Fusion Center

Independent Variable

Distinguish between two types of quantities being considered, separating
them into those available at the start of a process and those being created
by it, where the latter (dependent variables) are dependent on the former
(independent variables) (in research) a variable that is manipulated

Gulf Cooperation Council
Global Maritime Partnerships Game
Directs researchers to look for patterns in data so that they can make
general statements about the phenomena they examined

International Maritime Organization
An object, thing, action or situation that causes an obstruction, forms a
barrier, creates a difficulty, a nuisance or a disorder that prevents
achievement of concrete goals

(controlled) by the researcher and evaluated by its measurable effect on the
dependent variable or variables.

Inductive

A kind of reasoning that draws generalized conclusions from a finite
collection of specific observations

Interagency

Of or pertaining collectively to the departments and agencies of the U.S.
Government or the processes and interaction between those departments
and agencies. The coordination that occurs between elements of
Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies,
nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international
organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. See also
international organization; nongovernmental organizations
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
International Ship and Port Facility Security
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
International Seapower Symposium
All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on
a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related
activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances

IONS
ISPS
ISR
ISS
Maritime Domain
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Maritime Domain
Awareness

The effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime
domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of
a nation

MarView
MSSIS
NATO

Maritime View
Maritime Safety and Security Information System
North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NETSAFA
NMIC
Phenomenological

Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity
National Maritime Intelligence Center
A body of knowledge which relates empirical observations of phenomena
to each other; based upon a philosophical approach and method of qualitative
research in which the essence of an experience is sought.

PRC

A Marine, Super Yacht and Defense consultancy offering maritime
subject matter expertise to the general marine world (This was used?)

Qualitative

Descriptions or distinctions based on some quality or characteristic rather
than on some quantity or measured value

ReCAAP

Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery
Relating to a specific geographic area
Regional Maritime Information Exchange
1. No infrastructure available to establish Lack of MDA
2. Lack of appreciation of the importance of the sea; A lack of political
and public focus and understanding of important maritime issues,
resulting in the maritime domain receiving low priority without
appreciation for the consequences of neglect
Represents vessels at various ports and harbors in the Philippine where it
loads and discharges cargo and other goods

Regional
REMIX
Sea-blindness

SIEMS

SISTRAM

Maritime Information Traffic System

SUCBAS
Title X

Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea
A series of major service-sponsored war games that address future
capabilities in the context of Title X responsibilities to organize, train, and
equip its forces to carry out its roles and functions as a component of
national military capability
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Triangulation

Methodology that takes advantage of multiple techniques to derive the
same or very similar conclusions using different datasets or methods

VRMTC-A

Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center – Americas

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction
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